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1.

Introduction

The paper discusses two seemingly separated topics: the origin and function of the Liar Paradox in ancient
Greek philosophy and the Reduction ad absurdum mode of argumentation. Its goal is to show how the two
topics fit together and why they are closely connected.
The accepted tradition is that Eubulides of Miletos was the first to formulate the Liar Paradox correctly and that
the paradox was part of the philosophical discussion of the Megarian School. Which version of the paradox
was formulated by Eubulides is unknown, but according to some hints given by Aristotle and an incorrect
version given by Cicero1, the version was probably as follows:
The paradox is created from the Liar sentence ‘I am lying’. Given this sentence, the paradox is
generated in two stages. First, assume that the speaker is telling the truth when he is saying ‘I am
lying’, and thus, the case is that he is lying. Therefore, if he speaks the truth then he is lying. The
second half of the paradox is based on the assumption that the speaker is lying when he says ‘I am
lying’. In this case, what is asserted is not the case and, thus, he is not lying. Therefore, if he is lying
then he is telling the truth (assuming that ‘not false’ is equivalent to ‘true’). The conjunctual
conclusion from the two halves is that he is telling the truth if and only if he is lying. This is a selfcontradiction or a logical absurdity.
Robert Martin, the editor of Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, writes in his introduction that "the
Liar Paradox has intrigued and frustrated philosophers since the fourth century BC"2. Charles Parsons goes
on and asks, "Why is it that today... the Liar Paradox is still discussed as if it were an open question?"3. Many
solutions have been offered to solve the paradox but none have received any agreement. The two anthologies
edited by Robert Martin represent the enormous diversity, as well as the disagreement, which characterize the
field4. This paper does not offer yet another solution, but proposes instead a way to understand its
philosophical nature and function. A better understanding of any paradox is after all a sort of a solution. The
purpose of this paper is to tell a story about the philosophical background of the emergence of the Liar
Paradox and its philosophical role in one of the important controversies in ancient Greek philosophy5. It is
more of a story than a scholarly commentary because all the surviving Greek texts that mention the paradox
are sparse and seem enigmatic on first view. It is difficult to understand each text separately, and even more
difficult to see all of them as part of one philosophical discussion. No one knows what was the exact version
formulated by Eubulides, nor is it known just what motivations Eubulides may have had for presenting the
paradox. The history of the paradox through the stages of Greek philosophy is also unknown. These are
presumably the reasons why the main scholarly commentaries of Greek and Hellenistic philosophy do not give
a thoroughly analysis of the Liar Paradox, of its origin, motives and function.
The proposed story of the Liar Paradox in Greek philosophy has two advantages here. Each ancient text that
mentions the Liar Paradox becomes meaningful in itself and many texts appear to take part in an important
philosophical controversy. The controversy involves the justification of realism and its concepts of objective
truth and certainty, which was central to Greek and Hellenistic philosophy. The main claim that underlies the
proposed story is that the Liar Paradox was employed by Eubulides and later Greek philosophers to criticize
the realist position in metaphysics and epistemology. First it was employed by the Megarian School against
the realism advocated by Aristotle, but it was most notably employed by the skeptics of the Academy against
the realism held by the Stoics and their claims to knowledge. It was also part of the intensive use of the
Reduction ad Absurdum mode of argumentation by Greek skeptics. The story in principle is that the Liar
Paradox was used as part of a Reduction ad Absurdum argument that was intended to refute the realist

Paradox was used as part of a Reduction ad Absurdum argument that was intended to refute the realist
concept of truth, as first formulated by Aristotle and then developed by Stoicism. The Liar Paradox was used
as a justification of the claim that the realist concept of truth is logically inconsistent and thus has to be
rejected.
The proposed understanding of the Liar Paradox is, however, contrary to the prevalent modern understanding
of the paradox, according to which it is essentially a semantic anomaly of natural language and thus in need of
a solution or dissolution. The remedy proposed is usually the formalization of a better theory of meaning, which
will avoid the paradox all together and free language from this threat. The proposed story alters this semantic
tendency, offering a new way to understand the Liar Paradox even in its modern context. In this story, the
paradox is not a part of natural language or any formal language, but an undesirable consequence of the
metaphysical and epistemological doctrine of realism. Thus, the paradox should not be classified and
understood as a semantic paradox. It should be reconstructed anew as part of a metaphysical argument
resembling other well-known skeptical arguments. It stops being an anomaly in need of a solution and
becomes a part of a refutation used by Greek and modern skeptics to criticize various dogmatic doctrines in
philosophy. Although the paper will not touch upon the modern discussion of the paradox, the implications are
obvious

1.1

The Story of the Liar Paradox

The proposed story of the Liar Paradox in Greek philosophy is interwoven with the story of a major controversy
between two main trends in Greek philosophy: skepticism and realism. Among the schools that influenced the
development of Greek skepticism is the Megarian School, which among its many philosophical achievements,
also first formulated the Liar Paradox in its correct form. The school adopted Parmenides’ metaphysics, was
influenced by Zeno’s dialectics, and rejected the realism advocated by Aristotle. The philosophizing method
used by this school was refutations by means of Reductio ad Absurdum or Reductio ad Impossibile modes
of argumentation. This method was called dialectics in Greek philosophy. One of the arguments developed by
the Megarian School in their controversy with Aristotle's philosophy was based on the Liar Paradox. The
premises of this argument were necessary assumptions of the realist concept of truth, as defined by Aristotle,
and its conclusion was the contradiction generated by the paradox. The derivation of a contradictory
conclusion was used as a basis for refuting its premises, in accordance with the standard use of the
Reduction ad Absurdum argument form.
In this way, the Megarian School showed that the realist concept of truth held by Aristotle is necessarily
inconsistent, and thus must be rejected on logical grounds. However, the Megarian School did not engage only
in negative philosophizing, but also adopted Parmenides’ metaphysics as part of its positive philosophy. The
rejection of Aristotle’s philosophy was part of their project to establish this metaphysics, similar to the way
Zeno of Elea had defended the positions held by his teacher, Parmenides. The details of their philosophy are
unfortunately not very well known at present. The above sketch does provide, however, the background for the
emergence of the Liar Paradox6.
The subsequent events in the history of the Liar Paradox mainly involve its place in the controversy over the
justification of realism. Some of the philosophers who were influenced by the Megarian philosophy were
members of the skeptical Academy. The skeptic philosophers of the Academy continued to use the Megarian
dialectical method, but now they used it against any philosophical claim that purported to be certain, while
abandoning the Parmenidean metaphysics that had been adopted by their Megarian forebears. They focused
on strengthening and improving the Megarian negative arguments and the dialectical method of arguing that
used mainly to provide refutations. The Reductio ad Absurdum mode of argumentation was only one. These
philosophers also adopted the Liar Paradox as an anti-realist argument. The version of realism that the
skeptics rejected was not the Aristotelian one but the Stoic version7. Yet, some of the philosophers of the
skeptical Academy were not satisfied only with negative philosophizing, but developed a relativist and antirealist epistemology and an alternative perspective to the ruling realist metaphysics. The most famous head of
the skeptical Academy, Carneades of Cyrene, is known for his theory of plausibility (pithamós), which was
introduced as an alternative epistemology to the Stoic realism and then became a wholly new philosophical

introduced as an alternative epistemology to the Stoic realism and then became a wholly new philosophical
perspective. The skeptics generally, proposed various subjective and anti-realist concepts of truth and
justification instead of the realist concepts that were advocated mainly by the Stoics. The place of Liar
Paradox in this continual controversy was that of refuting the logical consistency of the realist concepts of truth
and certainty, thereby giving some plausibility to alternative anti-realist concepts8.
The main claim of the paper is that this account fits well with the known evidence regarding the Liar Paradox in
Greek philosophy. The evidence consists of texts that refer directly to the Liar Paradox and those that refer to
the various schools that dealt with the paradox, either accepting or rejecting it. These are mainly the Megarian
School and the skeptical Academy, on the one hand, and the opposing realist camp, mainly Aristotle and the
Stoics, on the other. This story will be elaborated in the rest of the paper.

1.2

Evidence about the Liar Paradox in Greek Philosophy

The main scholarly problem faced by every attempt to understand the place of the Liar Paradox in Greek
philosophy is the scarcity of the evidence on this topic. All that is available today are a few fragments and
testimonies, most of them nothing more than titles of books which supposedly dealt with the paradox. The
ancient doxographers, such as Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch and Sextus Empiricus, only mention the paradox,
without providing any information about the philosophical context in which it was formulated and discussed. All
the substantial testimonies that explicitly mention the paradox will be discussed here9.
The earliest evidence is from the first century AD, but it probably refers to the fifth century BC. The Liar
Paradox was known from ancient times as the paradox of Epimenides. St. Paul brings the story of
Epimenides of Crete in his Epistle to Titus. This was just before Titus left for Crete to take care of the spiritual
needs of the believers and to spread the Christian message among the pagans. It seems that the second
mission was expected to face grave difficulties due to some moral flaws of the Cretans. In this context, Paul
says:
[One of the Cretans, their own prophet, said of them]: The Cretans are always Liars, evil beasts, lazy
stomachs. [3B1]10

This remark is presented as a direct citation of Epimenides. If so, then the beginning of the Liar Paradox is
somewhere at the end of the sixth century and the beginning of the fifth century BC.
In light of the context of this citation, it is reasonable to assume that Paul was not intending to discuss abstract
philosophical issues in logic and metaphysics with Titus. He said what he did in a specific religious and moral
context, with the intention of pointing out the dubious reputation of the people of Crete from ancient times11.
What Epimenides said is not a genuine paradox. One can consistently assume that he lied, or at least did not
tell the truth12. Even the Greeks noticed that there is something wrong with the story in which one of the
Cretans says about his compatriots, including himself, that they are always liars. Nobody took this story in this
formulation seriously because of the trivial solution: One can assume that one of the Cretans told the truth at
least once, even if accidentally and due to absentmindedness. In this case, Epimenides’ assertion is simply
false and it is not true that all the Cretans always lie. Thus a religious man, who was also a prophet, was lying as if this fact should surprise us. It surely did not surprise the Greeks, considering their particular religion13.
There is no information about this paradox until the middle of the fourth century BC. An interesting fact is that
Plato probably did not know about it. This can be inferred indirectly from the Euthydemus, which is not later
than 420 BC. In this dialogue, Plato discusses problems that are close to that of the Liar Paradox, but he does
not mention the paradox itself, does he make use of its particular characteristics. This is evident from
Euthydemus' discussion of the question of whether false statements have a meaning. According to
Euthydemus’ theory of meaning, all statements must be true and none can be false. The justification for this is
that a meaningful statement is one that describes actual state of affairs. Accordingly, a false statement must
describe what is not the actual case, and thus, what does not exist. This, however, is just nothing at all, and no
statement can say "nothing":
...he who tells what is, and things that are, tells the truth...No one, I suppose, speaks what is not - for thereby

...he who tells what is, and things that are, tells the truth...No one, I suppose, speaks what is not - for thereby
he would be making something; and you have agreed that one cannot so much as make what is not - so that,
by your account, no one speaks what is false14.

The corollary is that no contradiction is possible either, since the logical subject of two contradictory
statements must be the same, yet one of them must describe what is not the case. Two contradictory
statements, therefore, must describe two different subjects; otherwise, one of them is meaningless15. This
sort of discussion is clearly relevant to the difficulty raised by the Liar Paradox, since it is a typical case of two
contradictory statements with one logical subject (i.e., 'what I have said'). It, however, misses the point raises
by the paradox, since the paradox describes, prima facie, perfectly legitimate circumstances of true and false
statements and a contradiction which arises from a specific legitimate use of ‘true’ and ‘false’. Plato, in this
section of the dialogue, does not address the conflict between a given statement, regardless of its truth-value,
and an assertion of the truth or falsity of the statement. In modern terms, he does not recognize the difference
in type between a statement in an object language and describing it or assigning it a truth-value in a metalanguage.
Aristotle’s On Sophistical Refutations is the source for the second direct evidence of the Liar Paradox.
The argument is similar which deals with the question whether the same man can say what is at the same
time both true and false16.

The passage is taken from one of Aristotle’s early works, and thus dates to the middle of the fourth century.
The fact that the paradox appears precisely in On Sophistical Refutations has much significance, since
Aristotle deals there with syllogisms identified with philosophical controversies and the polemics of everyday
life. Most of the Organon is dedicated to arguments used in mathematical subject matter. Thus, it can be
inferred that Aristotle saw the Liar Paradox as part of a philosophical controversy rather than a logical or
semantical issue. This is an indication of the place the paradox had in the discussions held in the middle of the
fourth century.
The paradox’s reputation and popularity in the beginning of the third century BC can be inferred from its being
mentioned in a literary text. One of the apocryphal stories connected with the Liar Paradox is the story of the
death of the poet Philetas of Cos. The Roman writer Athenians of Naucratis tells that Philetas died because he
was troubled by the Liar Paradox:
Like Philetas of Cos, therefore, who pondered what he called 'the liar argument' (pseudológov), you run the risk
some day of being quite dried up, as he was, by these worries. For he became very much emaciated in body
through these studies, and died, as the epitaph on his monument shows: 'Stranger, I am Philetas. The liar
argument (lógon o pseudómenós) caused my death, and studies of riddles late at eve17.

There is probably more than one liar here in the case of Athenians. However, his testimony, doubtful as it is,
does indicate one important fact. The Liar Paradox was known at the beginning of the third century even
outside philosophical circles. Assuming that the Greeks' intellectual life was similar to that of modern times,
this testimony has an important implication: The fact that a philosophical problem became known in literary
circles shows that it must have been widely discussed previously in philosophical circles.
The fourth evidence is the testimony that Eubulides of Miletos was the first to correctly formulate the Liar
Paradox, as well as several other well-known paradoxes. Eubulides lived in the fourth century and was a pupil
of the first head of the Megarian School, Euclides of Megara18. This testimony accords with those of Aristotle
and Athenians. Accordingly, the paradox existed and was being already discussed in the middle of the fourth
century. The fact that it was formulated and discussed by Eubulides and the Megarian School has important
consequences for understanding it. Neither the version of the paradox as was formulated by Eubulides, nor the
philosophical context in which it was discussed, are known, however.
Philosophical interest in the paradox continued among the philosophers of the Peripatetic School. This fact is
significant, since the Megarian School, which originated the paradox, is known to have been a stern
philosophical opponent of Aristotelian philosophy. Theophrastus of Arsos, a pupil and a friend of Aristotle, and

philosophical opponent of Aristotelian philosophy. Theophrastus of Arsos, a pupil and a friend of Aristotle, and
the head of the school after Aristotle’s death in 322, wrote three books on the Liar Paradox.
On Truth and Falsehood, one book…
Two books of Refutative Arguments.
Theses, three books19.

However, nothing is known about the content of these books, apart from their titles.
Philosophical discussion in the Liar Paradox continued well into the third century, as it is evident from the
extensive work done on the subject by Chrysippus of Soli. He wrote several books on the paradox20.
Introduction to the Liar argument (pseudómenon), addressed to Aristocreon, one book.
Arguments of the Liar Type, to serve as Introduction, one book.
Of the Liar Argument, addressed to Aristocreon, six books.
...
Reply to those who hold that Propositions may be at once False and True, one book.
To those who solve the Liar [argument] by dissecting it, addressed to Aristocreon, two books.
...
On the Solution of the Liar, addressed to Aristocreon, three books.
...
To those who maintain that the Premises (lémmata) of the Liar are false, one book.

These books discuss the nature of the Liar Paradox and the various solutions that had been offered for its
solution, including probably the one proposed by Chrysippus himself. At least three of the books introduce the
problem raised by the paradox. The other books survey the various approaches to its analysis and its possible
solutions. For instance, one of them deals with the possibility that propositions (axiôma) can be
simultaneously true and false. Another one deals with the possibility of logically decomposing the paradoxical
argument and showing why it is not a paradox after all.
Chrysippus was influenced to a great extant by the Megarian teachings on logic and dialectics. He eventually
became a head of the Stoic School in the third century. Thus, it is evident that the paradox was discussed to a
great length by the Megarian School in the third century. Chrysippus also proposes a solution to the paradox,
one of the two that survived from this period, the first one having been proposed by Aristotle. The two solutions
will be discussed below (section 5), since they provide important support for the interpretation proposed here.
For now, these two solutions make the best sense if they are interpreted as a classical move facing a
Reductio ad Absurdum argument, such as the one that uses the Liar Paradox. The titles of the books written
by Chrysippus are indeed similar to the titles used today for books that deal with the Liar Paradox. Not much
has been changed from the third century BC as far as the titles of the books are concerned. Again, the
problem is that almost nothing is known about their content.
The earliest full version of Liar Paradox is given by Cicero thus belonging to the Roman period from the first
half of the first century BC. In his Academica, Cicero introduces the paradox as follows:
What of the fact that this same science [dialectic] destroys at the end the steps that came before, like
Penelope unweaving her web?… Clearly it is a fundamental principle of dialectic that every statement (termed
by them [stoicism] axiôma, that is, a 'proposition') is either true or false; what then? Is this a true proposition
or a false one - 'if you say that you are lying and say it truly, you lie'? Your school [Stoicism] of course says
that these problems are 'insoluble,' which is more vexatious than the things termed by us [the skeptical

that these problems are 'insoluble,' which is more vexatious than the things termed by us [the skeptical
Academy] 'not grasped' and 'not perceived'21.

This passage will be discussed in section 2, below. The discussion of the Liar Paradox by Cicero in his
Academica is the most valuable source of information about the nature of the Liar Paradox and its
philosophical role in Greek philosophy. Although Cicero is the source to the earliest full formulation of the Liar
Paradox, his version is logically ill formed and inaccurate.
There are other known versions of the Liar Paradox, but all of them are later versions that belong to Roman
and Christian sources, most of them are dating to the second and third century AD22. Not much can be
learned from these versions about their Greek or Hellenistic origin or about the philosophical context in which
they were discussed. This concludes all the evidence about the Liar Paradox. It is clearly insufficient for a
thorough understanding of it. Any philosophical and scholarly interpretation of the Liar Paradox in Greek
philosophy must therefore be a speculative. Nevertheless, this paper ventures at offering such a speculative
interpretation - a story of a paradox.

1.3

The controversy between realism and skepticism in Greek philosophy

Before narrating the details of the story, two main assumptions that guide the proposed interpretation will be
introduced. The two assumptions are supported by the evidence brought above and in the following.
(A) First assumption: the Liar Paradox is not a sophism but a philosophical issue.
The first assumption is that the Liar Paradox is not a mere vacant sophism or brain twister, but part of a
fundamental philosophical issue having important implications for basic doctrines in philosophy. In light of this
assumption, the goal of the proposed interpretation is to find the role of the paradox in the general
philosophical discourse in Greek philosophy. This assumption is based, inter alia, on the titles of Chrysippus'
books. These titles show that the paradox was considered an important and complex philosophical problem.
The various approaches to analyzing the paradox hinted at by some of titles also reveal that the paradox was
considered a problem with a bearing on basic philosophical difficulties.
However, the most interesting title for our present propose is the one that deals with the possibility that the
assumptions, leading to the paradox are just false. The Greek word lêmma, which appears in the title of the
book, was used by Chrysippus in other contexts as a well-defined logical concept to designate the premises
or assumptions of an argument (lógos). These are the propositions (axiôma) that one agrees upon in advance
for the sake of establishing (epiphorá) the conclusion23. According to Chrysippus, a valid argument is one
such that the negation of its conclusion is inconsistent with the conjunction of its premises. He applies this
definition as a corollary to the case in which an argument has a false or even a contradictory conclusion. He
discusses the possibility that the falsehood of the premises can be inferred from this, given that the argument
is valid. The inference regarding the truth-value of the premises is based on this assumption. Only in a valid
argument can the falseness of the premises be inferred from the falseness of the conclusion. Chrysippus'
discussion is an important justification of the suggestion that the Liar Paradox was part of a philosophical
argument or a chain of such arguments meant to refute the premises responsible for its emergence24.
Consequently, this book of Chrysippus probably dealt with the possibility that, although the Liar Paradox is a
valid argument, it is not a sound one, and thus, resembles the argument form of Reductio ad Absurdum. One
of the meta-logic achievements of Stoicism involved the nature of arguments, and the one that is important to
the discussion here is the clear definition of the difference between valid and sound arguments. There is
evidence that paradoxes were used in the Megarian School and the skeptical Academy as conclusions of
having Reductio ad Absurdum arguments. Still, the premises of the argument in which the Liar Paradox was
used as a conclusion are unknown. It can be argued, however, that the paradox must have been a part of a
skeptical argument that questioned the legitimacy of some important philosophical claims.
(B) Second Assumption: The premises that led to the emergence of the Liar Paradox are necessary to
realism.

The second assumption that the proposed interpretation relies on involves the question just asked: What were
the philosophical claims that functioned as premises to the argument with the Liar Paradox as its conclusion?
In answering the question, the proposed interpretation embraces a wide conception of the main trends in
Greek and Hellenistic philosophy and the main issues that troubled the philosophers of these periods. Central
to it is a specific understanding of Greek philosophy, according to which skepticism stands at the focus.
Moreover, one of the main goals of Greek skepticism was the metaphysical and epistemological criticism of
the realist concept of truth. This understanding of Greek skepticism is contrary to the traditional interpretation,
which considers only clearly nihilistic views to be skeptical ones. Only recently has there been a critical
modification of the understanding of the centrality and significance of Greek skepticism. One of the claims is
that most of the criticism raised by Greek skepticism was aimed at the realist concept of truth, such as the
Aristotelian or the Stoic one. The skeptical Academy, as one of the important trends in late Greek skepticism,
even formulated an epistemological alternative to the realist concept of truth. Contrary to the realist, absolutist
and objective concept of truth, it formulated a relativist, subjective and anti-realist one. The criticism raised by
Greek skepticism against realism was extended even to logic. The arguments of the skeptics made use of
logic for analyzing metaphysical and epistemological claims, but this use was serious and conscious25.
The proposed interpretation relies on the work done by Leo Groarke on the sources and nature of Greek
skepticism26. The main thesis Groarke advances is that Greek skepticism is the ancestor of modern antirealism, since Greek skepticism is mainly a criticism of realist metaphysics, epistemology and theory of truth.
Groarke argues at length that the key to understanding Greek skepticism, as with modern anti-realism, is its
criticism of the realist concept of truth. Greek skepticism even discusses the possibility of an alternative
concept of truth as a basis for anti-realist epistemology and metaphysics; a concept based on subjective and
relativist characteristics. In most of the trends in Greek skepticism, the concept of truth is based on several
characteristics, for instance, that belief is conditioned by the attributes of human nature (e.g., perception), the
cultural context, the philosophical presuppositions a person takes upon himself and the like27. Groarke's work
is used here as a scholarly framework for the proposed interpretation. It remains now to see how the Liar
Paradox can be integrated into this controversy as a Reductio ad Absurdum argument design to refute the
realist concept of truth.

2.
The Liar Paradox as a form of skepticism in Greek and Hellenistic philosophy:
Cicero's testimony in his Academia II.

The pivotal evidence for the proposed interpretation is the historical fact that the Liar Paradox is explicitly
formulated as one of the arguments used by the skeptical Academy28. The crucial testimony is given by
Cicero in his Academica, in which the Liar Paradox is introduced as one of the types of critical arguments
used by skepticism29. Cicero's work deals with epistemological issues connected to the theory of knowledge
and introduces the various contrasting schools on this issue. It joins three main figures in the history of the
Academy in the Hellenistic period: The first is Carneades of Cyrene, who represents the moderate skepticism
of the middle Academy. He was one of the most famous heads of the skeptical Academy and the successor of
Arcesilaus of Pitane. He is known for his theory about plausibility (pithamós) as the essential concept in his
criticism of other positions, which can also be understood as a basis for a skeptical and anti-realist criterion of
truth. The second figure is Philo of Larissa, the last head of the skeptical Academy, the successor of
Clitomachus in 109 BC. He tried to formulate a compromise between the skepticism of Arcesilaus and
Carneades and the original Platonic dogmatism. He also was engaged in epistemological disputes with
Antiochus of Ashkelon, the third figure. Antiochus was a pupil of Philo of Larissa and a member of the later
Academy. He rejected the Academy's skepticism, which had ruled since Arcesilaus of Pitane. He proposed a
dogmatic and syncretic system of philosophy, a mixture of Platonic, Stoic and Aristotelian ideas, which he
presented as the ‘original tradition’ of the pre-skeptical Academy. He founded his own school, regarded by
some as a continuation of the Academy, which was accordingly named the "fifth" Academy of the first century
BC30.

Cicero's work consists mainly of two speeches: The first was given by the Roman commander Lucullus in favor
of Antiochus of Ashkelon and against Carneades of Cyrene. After a short intermediate chapter, the Cicero's
reply in favor of Carneades' skepticism is introduced.

2.1

Lucullus' speech: A defense of the dogmatism of Antiochus of Ashkelon

Lucullus begins by arguing that the philosophers of the Academy, such Arcesilaus and Carneades, were
distorting the theories of the ancient philosophers in attributing them the opinion that it is impossible to know
anything (Academica II.17-18). Lucullus argues that the great philosophers of ancient times did succeeded in
establishing the truth and even organizing the body of philosophical knowledge (II.14). He tries to show that
those who argue, like Philo of Larissa, that it is impossible to know anything are caught up in a contradiction.
For if nothing can be known, then this claim too cannot be known; thus it is impossible to know that everything
is incomprehensible (II.17-18). Using the Stoic viewpoint, Lucullus defends the adequacy of sensory
perceptions as a criterion of truth, given that they operate normally (II.19ff). Furthermore, Lucullus argues that
the claim of the philosophers of the Academy that knowledge is impossible takes all value out of life and
eventually destroys life itself (II.31). Their theory of plausibility makes it impossible to determine clearly what is
good and bad, true and false (II.33). The rejection of the possibility of knowledge eliminates any possibility of
action or free will in life (II.38-39). In his speech, Lucullus addresses some of the main claims made by the
skeptics of the Academy. One of them is that, although some sense perceptions are true and some are false,
there is no way to distinguish between them (II.40). For instance, there is no way to distinguish between
imaginary perceptions, such as those caused by dreams, drunkenness or insanity, and true perceptions.
Lucullus' answer to this basic skeptical claim is that common sense can distinguish clearly between them and
can thus serve as a reliable criterion of truth (II.41-55). On the one hand, Carneades argues that the same
properties are common to truth and falsehood, yet on the other he accepts the positive theory of plausibility.
The acceptance of the theory of plausibility is, however, in contradiction to the negative skeptic claims.
Arcesilaus is more consistent, says Lucullus, since he is more reserved in his judgment and confines himself
solely to the negative criticism of knowledge (II.56-60). Lucullus concludes his speech in advising Cicero not to
follow the school that mixes the true with the false, thus eliminating any possibility of judgment or ability to
initiate rational actions. Cicero, who had discovered the conspiracy of Catilina, exposed the most secret plots
and declared under oath and with confidence that he knew all about them, cannot deny that there are things
that can be known (II.61-62).
After a short intermediate chapter comes the Cicero's reply. He begins by responding to the "advice" given to
him by Lucullus, according to which he is to avoid associating himself with an inappropriate school. Cicero
says that he did not join the school of Arcesilaus and Carneades because of misjudgment or weakness of
mind. On the contrary, he is eager to find the truth and thinks that the most beautiful thing is to discern truth and
the ugliest thing is to mistake falsehood for truth. The duty of the wise man is to avoid to hallucinations and
make sure that he does not err in his judgment (II.64-68). However, Cicero criticizes Antiochus for abandoning
the skeptical theory of the middle Academy and joining Stoicism (II.69-71). Then he attempts to answer the
Lucullus' criticism: The philosophers of the Academy did not distort the views of the Presocratic philosophers,
since they did doubt the possibility of knowing the truth (II.72-78). Furthermore, the justification offered by
Lucullus for his assertion that the senses, when functioning normally, yield reliable criteria of truth is very
unsatisfactory and superficial (II.79-81). Cicero's reply is composed of four main claims: (a) Some sense
perceptions are false. (b) False perceptions are indistinguishable for the true ones. (c) There is no way to
determine which perceptions are distinguishable and which cannot. (d) Any true perception can merge with
another perception, which is indistinguishable from it, and yet cannot be recognized as such (II.81-86). The
claim that people who were asleep, drunk or insane know that their perceptions were false after they resume
their normal state and clear vision does not prove anything. These hallucinations were judged as true and thus
real at the time they occurred (II.88-90).
These arguments are part of the tendency of the skeptical Academy to doubt and consequently reject the
possibility of knowing the truth in its realist sense and establishing it beyond any reasonable doubt. Cicero
divides their arguments into three main groups. First, are arguments that criticize the possibility of infallible

divides their arguments into three main groups. First, are arguments that criticize the possibility of infallible
knowledge based on empiricist notions. These arguments concentrate mainly on the limitations of the senses.
In the second group, Cicero gathers arguments taken from early skeptics, such as Democritus, Xenophon and
Protagoras, which were further developed by the skeptical Academy for their own use. These two groups
constitute the arguments that are directed against the reliability of the senses. The third group of arguments
will be discussed in the next section.

2.2
The place of the Liar Paradox in the philosophy of the Skeptical Academy: Criticism of
dialectics
The second part of Cicero's speech contains the third group of arguments, which involve the paradoxes and
were the basis for the criticism of the reliability of the mind and rational thought. Not only sense perceptions
are unreliable, but also the mind is incapable of perceiving the truth. These paradoxes where taken mainly
from the Megarian school and the Socratic heritage. One of the main influences of the skeptical Academy was
the use of dialectics. However, the skeptics of the Academy showed that dialectics, which was supposed to
distinguish truth from falsehood according to Stoicism, is often incapable of determining what is true and what
is false. At this point Cicero examines the nature of dialectics, which was adopted by the skeptical Academy
as its philosophical methodology of inquiry31. The Liar Paradox and other paradoxes are discussed in this
context. Cicero first discusses the Sorites paradox and shows that dialectics is unable to resolve the problem
of the addition or subtraction of very small particles. The same reasoning that is used for the Sorites paradox
occurs in many cases where a clear distinction is sought, as between rich and poor, or big and small. There is
no reliable way of determining how much must be added or subtracted for the construction of a precise
concept. Then Cicero discusses the Liar Paradox, which he introduced as part of the skeptical criticism of the
possibility of knowing the truth by the use of dialectics. Dialectics cannot determine if the following sentence is
true or false: "If you say that you are lying and say it truly, you lie?" (II.91-98, see the citation above). This
formulation of Cicero is logically incorrect. One correct formulation is given at the beginning of the paper.
The Liar Paradox is discussed by Cicero as one of the refutation arguments used by the skeptical Academy
and he analyzes it as such. He starts by listing the assumptions that lead to the paradox:
(1) Propositions are identified as the truth-bearers.
(2) The principles of classic logic (the principles of contradiction, excluded middle and
bivalence) determine truth.
(3) The corespondent relation: A sentence is true (e.g., "it is
light" is true) if and only if reality is as described (e.g., it is now
daylight).
These three assumptions constitute necessary conditions for any realist theory of truth, such as these
advocated by Aristotle or the Stoics. It is clear that they are a summary of the necessary conditions that any
realist concept of truth must presuppose. Exactly these conditions were introduced by Aristotle as part of his
detailed discussions in the Organon (see section 3, below). Cicero claims that these are the assumptions that
lead to the Liar Paradox. This main argument is that there is no crucial difference between the Liar sentence ‘I
am lying’ and any other simple descriptive sentence, such as 'It is light'. First, both are equally legitimate truthbearers. Second, both of them are subject in the same way to the same laws of logic. Third, the Liar sentence
is a legitimate substitution in the realist truth schema of correspondence, just like the sentence 'It is light'. This
is true even if substituting the innocent sentence does not raise any problem, while substituting the Lair
sentence exposes the paradoxical nature of the realist truth definition. The Liar Paradox is thus presented as
part of a skeptical argument of the Reductio ad Absurdum form. It aims at refuting the foundations of a realist
theory of truth, the Stoic theory in this case.
The exposition given by Cicero in his Academica hints at the philosophical context in which the Liar Paradox
was discussed. According to his testimony, the skeptical arguments of the third group the Reductio ad
Absurdum form. The Liar Paradox was used by the skeptical Academy as one of the paradoxes using this

form of argument, thus constituting part of an argument that was designed to show that several crucial
assumptions led to absurdities. The assumptions above are basic and necessary to realism in the form held
by the Stoic school at that time. According to Cicero, the paradox threatens the very nature of the realist
concept of truth as a correspondent concept that is based, inter alia, on the principles of contradiction and the
excluded middle. These principles constituted the semantical and metaphysical content of the realist concept
of truth and its philosophical function as well. The skeptical Academy took these principles as the premises of
an argument in which the Liar Paradox functioned as the conclusion. This suggests that the Liar Paradox was
part of the controversy between realism and anti-realist skepticism in Greek philosophy.
Lucullus, who presents the dogmatic version of traditional Platonism, notes that the paradox was regarded by
the skeptical Academy as unsolvable (aropá). This remark fits well with the approach of the skeptical
Academy, since they did not consider the paradox a problem to be solved. According to the skeptical
approach, the paradox was supposed to show that realism leads to a dead end, as a symptom to the internal
inconsistency of the philosophical assumptions that led to its emergence. Cicero notes that one of the
remarkable Stoic logicians, Chrysippus of Soli, failed to solve the paradox. The mere fact that he tried to solve
it is important to the interpretation proposed here. If one chooses to adopt the premises leading to the
paradox, then one must show why the argument is invalid for saving the premises (as will be discussed in
section, 5.2 below). This fact coincides well with the fact that the skeptical Academy was in particular
opposition to the realist philosophy of Stoicism. Stoicism turned out to be the leading philosophical school of
the Hellenistic period while the Academy declined and lost its leading role. Arcesilaus of Pitane and
Carneades of Cyrene, the Academy heads, saw the skeptical approach as the key to better competition with
the success of Stoicism and the renewal of the Academy's central place in Greek philosophy32. The
controversy was about the criterion of truth, which constitutes an important part of the criticism of the Stoic
theory of knowledge. The use of the Liar Paradox by the skeptical Academy is to be understood in view of this
fundamental philosophical controversy.
In this controversy Cicero sides with the skeptical Academy. The discussion of the Liar Paradox and others
led Cicero to the following main conclusion. Dialectics, as it was used by dogmatic philosophers, is useless
as a reliable tool for determining what is true and for distinguishing between the true and the false (II.91-98).
Consequently, as Carneades argues, one must adopt the theory of plausibility, since otherwise rationality will
become impossible. What the dogmatic think of as knowledge, is only verisimilitude in the eyes of the
Academy skeptics (II.99-105). Cicero notes that even the Stoic philosophers had their doubts regarding the
epistemological question of reliability and certainty. The Stoic Panaitius of Rhodes, for instance, doubts "the
truth the pronouncements of diviners, of auspices and oracles, of dreams and soothsaying". Although a Stoic,
he clearly abstains from passing judgment on these matters (II.106-107). However, a person who plans her
actions according to plausibility has all the possibilities open for her to act (II.108-109). The dogmatic
philosophers claim that only they know the truth, but their students accept what they are taught uncritically and
see themselves as obligated to believe it without any further investigation. The philosophers of the Academy,
on the other hand, are free to look for the truth without any restriction, and they can examine freely which of the
claims it the closest to the truth - the most plausible (II.7-9). It does not follow from the claim that there is no
certain knowledge, but only plausibility, that people cannot act in practical life. The difficulties in epistemology
exist only for the theoretical mind and not for the practical one, as plausibility is sufficient for practical actions.
People, guided by the practical mind and sense perceptions, can give affirmative or negative answers to
practical questions (II.104, cf. 61). Even the assumption that nothing can be known is considered by the
Academic philosophers as only a plausible claim and not as an absolute truth (II.110). Furthermore, the
correctness of skepticism is affirmed by the differences that exist between the opinions of philosophers, as
each of them claiming that only he knows what is true (II.115). This is the case in the philosophy of nature
(II.116-128), ethics (II.128-141), and epistemology (II.142-146). This criticism is attributed to Antiochus, who
argued that there is conformity among Platonism, Aristotelism and Stoicism. Cicero ends his speech in
observing that in view of the contrasting philosophical theories that exist among distinguished philosophers, it
is impossible that only one philosophical theory can be true while all the other known philosophical theories
must vanish (II.147).

The Liar Paradox should be understood against the background of this central philosophical controversy. It
was used then as a part of an epistemological and metaphysical argument and had a clear negative
philosophical purpose - that of refuting realism33. A fundamental distinction in Greek philosophy was that
between the phenomenal, as it appears (pháinesthai) to the senses, and the real or actual (péphuke). The
skeptics argued that there is no way to establish a reliable and undoubted relation between sense perceptions
(aísthesis) and reality. Thus they distinguished between what is seemingly true, based on sense perceptions,
and what is true (alethés) in the realist and objective sense, namely, exists in the real world. The Liar Paradox
was part of a negative move for establishing the inaccessibility of realist truth. It was thus not considered as a
problem in need of a solution, but as part of a Reductio ad Absurdum argument that has destructive
consequences for realist epistemology and metaphysics.
The rest of the evidence to be discussed here supports this story of the Liar Paradox in Greek philosophy.

3.

The Greek concept of truth is a realist one

According to the proposed story, the realist concept of truth is the target of the Liar Paradox destructive force.
Consequently, the exact meaning that Greek philosophy assigned to the concept of truth is important for
understanding the skeptical context in which the paradox was formulated.
The meaning of the word ‘truth’ in modern philosophy varies from one theory to another. In classical Greek
philosophy, the word ‘truth’ (alétheiâ) explicitly designated only the realist meaning. It was understood as
constituting a corespondent relation between language and objective reality, namely that a sentence is true if
and only if it describes the objective world correctly. Reality had the sense that what exists (einai or the real
world eteós or prâgma) exists in an objective and autonomous way and its existence does not depend on the
knowing subject or his perceptions34. This realist concept of truth is the focus of the criticism offered by Greek
skeptics. Thus, when they discuss the rejection of the possibility of knowing the truth, this should be understood
as applying only to the realist conception of truth. The various skeptical schools are united in the claim that
realist truth cannot be known and is thus inaccessible. They disagreed only on the question of whether another
concept of truth is conceivable at all and, if so, then which one. In this sense, modern anti-realism is not in
opposition to skepticism, but is a ramification of the Greek skeptical project. This is the perspective in which
the skeptical arguments in Greek philosophy, and the Liar Paradox in particular, should be evaluated.

3.1

The Aristotelian concept of truth is a realist one

One of the main targets of Greek skepticism is undoubtedly Aristotle, as he was the first to explicitly define the
concept of truth and its philosophical background and presuppositions. One of the main issues raised by
Aristotle in the Metaphysics is the ontological question about objective reality, whose existence does not
depend on the knowing subject. It is the ontological issue of existence or being in itself (on e ón), and the
beings that exist (ta onta), which are the basis for truth and knowledge. Aristotle introduces the realist concept
of truth in Greek philosophy as follows:
This will be plain if we first define truth and falsehood. To say that what is is not, or that what is not is, is false;
but to say that what is is, and what is not is not, is true; and therefore also he who says that a thing is or is
not will say either what is true or what is false35.

This definition presupposes at least two assumptions that are necessary for any formulation of a realist
concept of truth. The first involves the nature of the truth-bearers and the second the relation of
correspondence, and the two are interwoven.

3.2

Two presuppositions to the realist concept of truth

The first necessary presupposition deals with the identity of the truth-bearers. Aristotle explicitly assigns the
truth predicate to mental entities, such as thoughts, and their linguistic expressions. He rejects the possibility
that truth is to be located in extra-linguistic objects or in the world and its states of affairs36. He is also aware

that truth is to be located in extra-linguistic objects or in the world and its states of affairs36. He is also aware
of the possibility that linguistic expressions (apophantikós) may change from one speaker to another, and that
the representation of meaning by linguistic expressions is subject to human conventions (kata sunthéken).
Consequently, linguistic expressions themselves cannot be used as the primary truth-bearers. Aristotle
argues, however, that this linguistic variety conceals uniformity at a deeper level: Language expresses
thoughts and thoughts relate to states of affairs or facts37. The relation between thoughts (noémata), as
mental entities, and states of affairs is fixed and based on the relation of similarity (omoiómata). In this way,
the thought becomes the primary truth-bearer. Language expresses thoughts, and therefore linguistic
expressions are only secondary truth-bearers. The truth-values of linguistic expressions are derived from the
thoughts they represent. In this way, the truth-values of linguistic expressions are indirectly derived from the
relation between the thoughts they represent and the states of affairs in the world38. Moreover, Aristotle
focuses his discussion on descriptive sentences (apóphansis or lógos apophantikós), distinguishing between
them and other meaningful expression that do not have truth-value, such as prayers39. The Aristotelian theory
of truth thus focuses only on linguistic entities that can describe reality in the realist sense40. Furthermore,
Aristotle distinguishes between a proposition and its components. The components, such as nouns and verbs,
are important, but they lack truth-value41. Only the complete sentence has a truth-value, since only it
represents a proposition or a thought, which is the primary truth-bearer. The realist framework that focuses on
truth is what gives philosophical importance to the Aristotelian distinction between a proposition and its
components. If this distinction is correct, then the first necessary condition for the Aristotelian theory of truth is
the identification of the truth-bearers, that is, the commitment to a continuum one end of which is the thoughts
that are expressed by language, while the other is the reality that is described by them42.
The second necessary presupposition of the realist concept of truth for Aristotle, which is also indirectly
necessary for the identification of the truth-bearers, is the claim about the relation of correspondence. Aristotle
was well aware of this necessary dependence, as he says:
And so,...the truth of propositions consists in corresponding with facts43.

Moreover, the realist concept of truth given by Aristotle is basically a semantic concept (in modern terms):
Now every proposition (k atáphasis), like an affirmative proposition (pásis) predicating something of something,
is true or false44.

Aristotle formulates the correspondent relation as a one between thoughts, which are expressed by language,
and extra-linguistics entities; in this relation the linguistic expressions (legómena) signify (semáibei) the extralinguistic entities. It is thus an objective relation that does not depends in any essential way on the knowing
subject.
This formulation enables Aristotle to distinguish between an ontic and semantic relation. Ontic relations exists
among extra-linguistic objects. The objects and the relations among them are given in objective reality, without
any connection to the linguistic domain and without any dependence on the knowing subject45. This is the
sense of an object in itself (tôn ónton). This is where the relation of "being in an object" (ev tivi eínai) belongs,
and this relation exists between objects in themselves and their predicates or properties. Semantic relations,
in contrast, occur between linguistic expressions and extra-linguistic entities. This is where the relation of
‘being a predicate of an object’ (kata tivos légesthai) belongs. This relation exists between the name of an
object and the object in itself, and between the name of a predicate and the occurrence of this predicate in the
object. The truth of a proposition denotes a semantic relation, and it is based on the existence of the
corresponding ontic relation. The knowing subject has no part in constituting these relations.
This meaning of the realist correspondent relation constitutes the realist concept of truth. This was evidently the
assumption in Greek philosophy regarding this concept. Sextus Empiricus, for instance, is not suspected of
adopting the realist concept of truth or the realist viewpoint. However, when he describes his starting point for
his discussion of the criterion for truth and knowledge, the concept he is referring to when he uses the word
‘true’ (alétheia) is unmistakably the realist one. It presupposes the objective relation of correspondence46.
This starting point is an echo of the semantic definition Aristotle gives to the concept of truth.

This starting point is an echo of the semantic definition Aristotle gives to the concept of truth.
The realist concept of truth, as Aristotle defines it, is clearly a metaphysical concept. This is not surprising in
view of the fact that he did not distinguish at all between logic, semantics and metaphysics, as some modern
philosophers and logicians do. It is also evident from the two main sources where Aristotle discusses the
concept of truth. The first source is Metaphysics, which interfaces smoothly and coherently with the
discussions in the second source, the Organon, which deals with more logical and semantical issues.
However, the Organon itself begins with the Categories, which is a metaphysical work. This characteristic
decisively influences our understanding of the Liar Paradox47.

3.3

The principles of logic as part of the realist concept of truth for Aristotle

Aristotle combines his metaphysical discussion of the concept of truth with logical principles, such as the
principles of contradiction and the excluded middle. There are two reasons why he sees these principles as an
essential part of the concept of truth. On the one hand, they control the functions of the truth-bearers, and on the
other, they tell us how to describe reality in its objective sense. In other words, these principles are woven into
the semantic and the ontic components of the concept of truth, and thus are necessary conditions for
constituting the metaphysical meaning of the realist concept of truth. This understanding contrasts with a
prevailing trend in modern philosophy, which sees the logical principles as formal and at times even
meaningless or schematic principles that are only part of specific logical systems. However, the connection
between the realist meaning of truth and these principles has raised complex conceptual difficulties in Greek
philosophy. Aristotle himself was well aware of some of these, such as the status of the principle of bivalence
regarding contingent propositions describing future events. The relevant fact here is that the formulations of
these principles are given by Aristotle as an integral part of his metaphysical discussion, and are deeply
interwoven into his general discussion of the concept of truth. The following sections bring some formulations
of Aristotle's, which exemplify this48.
A.

The Principle of Contradiction49
(1)Clearly, then, it is a principle of this kind that is the most certain of all principles... "It
is impossible for the same attribute at once to belong and not to belong to the same
thing and in the same relation"... This is the most certain of all principles, since it
possesses the required definition; for it is impossible for anyone to suppose that the
same thing is and is not... and [if] an opinion which contradicts another is contrary to it,
then clearly it is impossible for the same man to suppose at the same time that the
same thing is and is not; for the man who made this error would entertain two contrary
opinions at the same time. Hence all men who are demonstrating anything refer back to
this as an ultimate belief; for it is by nature the starting-point of all other axioms as
well50.
(2)[T]he most certain of all beliefs is that opposite statements are not both true at the same times... And since
the contradiction of a statement cannot be true at the same time of the same thing, it obvious that contraries
cannot apply at the same time to the same thing51.
(3)By demonstrative I mean the axioms from which all demonstration proceeds, e.g. "everything must be either
affirmed or denied," and "it is impossible at once to be and not to be" and all other such premises52.

B.

The Principle of the Excluded Middle53
(4)Nor indeed can there be any intermediate between contrary statements, but of one thing we must either
assent or deny one thing, whatever it may be54.
(5)[A]nd so we must argue from a definition, having first grasped what "falsehood" or "truth" means. And if to
assert what is true is nothing else than to deny what is false, everything cannot be false; for one part of the
contradiction must be true. Further, if everything must be either asserted or denied, both parts cannot be false;
for one and only one part of the contradiction is false55.

C.

The Principle of Bivalence

(6)We call propositions those only that have truth or falsity in them56.

Two conclusions from these formulations are important to the present issue. First, these principles are
unmistakably metaphysical. This conclusion is evident in light of Aristotle’s constant move between the
semantic and the ontic relations in the various formulations he offers for these principles. He does not
distinguish between a formulation that refers to propositions and their linguistic expressions (the semantic
relation), and one that refers to entities in the world and the relations between them (the ontic relation). The
move between the ontic and the semantic becomes possible and legitimate only in view of the metaphysical
nature of the correspondent relation. The second conclusion is that the principles necessarily presuppose the
realist concept of truth, such that their meaning is constituted by this concept. There is no adequate
understanding of their meaning and justification without first presupposing the realist concept of truth. For
instance, when Aristotle formulates the principle of the excluded middle (formulation 4), he immediately argues
that this definition is evident only if truth and falsehood are defined first:
This [the principle of the excluded middle] will be plain if we first define truth and falsehood57.

Then comes the realist definition that was cited above.

3.4

Early criticism of the realist concept of truth in Presocratic philosophy

Aristotle gives a detailed analysis, and consequently a definition, of a notion that was common in Greek
philosophy from its beginning. The germ of the doubts about the realist concept of truth can already be found in
Presocratic philosophy. Even then, the skeptical claim that humans are incapable of knowing the truth was
widely held58. The critical assertions of the Presocratic philosophers indicate clearly that they discussed the
issue of the accessibility of realist and objective truth, rather than any other concept of truth. However, no
explicit formulation of the realist concept of truth has survived Presocratic period, and there is no indication
such a well-defined philosophical concept existed at that time. The reason may be that the concept and its
exact meaning were well-known and thus in no need of citation. In any case, the critical assertions of some of
the more important Presocratic philosophers in the skeptical tradition cannot be understood without explicitly
presupposing the realist concept of truth. Two examples will be sufficient to illustrate this point.
The first assertion is due to Democritus of Abdera, who is important for the following because of his
responsibility for the early formulation of the Principle of Equivalence or the principle of Ou Mallon (see 6.2,
below). He argues that
We know nothing of reality [ètehê]; for truth lies in an abyss. [68B117]59

This assertion can have a consistent meaning only if the realist concept of truth, and the known difficulties that
are implied by its being a transcendental concept, are presupposed in the background. The metaphor of truth
being in an abyss is similar to Hilary Putnam’s metaphor of "from the God’s-eye point of view". Both
metaphors deny the possibility of knowing the truth and our ability to obtain reliable knowledge in a realist
sense. Without these presuppositions in the background, the citation from Democritus becomes cryptic, nearly
mystical.
Another proponent of skepticism is Xenophanes of Colophon. He explicitly argues for the fundamental
limitations of knowledge in its realist sense. He argues that there are things that no human being can know or
even know about:
And as for certain truth, no man has seen it, nor will there ever be a man who knows (eidôs) about the gods and
about all the things I mention. For even if he should actually succeed to the full in saying what is completely true, he
himself nevertheless does not know. But for all there is belief (dók os). [21B34]61

Xenophanes does not reject the possibility of knowledge in principle, but only reject the possibility of a certain
sort of knowledge. The positive aspect of his epistemological criticism is that knowledge (eidôs) and certain
truth should be replaced by belief (dókos) and verisimilitude. These should be the goals of human inquiry:

truth should be replaced by belief (dókos) and verisimilitude. These should be the goals of human inquiry:
Let these things be believed (dedoxasthô) as being similar to what is true. [21B36]

In other words, there is a sort of an unattainable and inaccessible knowledge, namely the realist sort. However,
this should be replaced with another sort of knowledge, more attainable and accessible, although more
subjective and relativist one, i.e., a sort of anti-realist epistemology. This double move, i.e., rejecting of realism
and adopting anti-realism, is characteristic of late Greek skepticism. Most notable for executing this double
move is Carneades of Cyrene of the middle Academy, with his theory of plausibility (pithamós). Now, if the
word 'truth' in Xenophanes is not confined to its realist meaning, his discussion becomes unclear.
There are more examples of this kind of skeptical criticism of the realist concept of truth in Presocratic
philosophy. They all share the assumption that the word ‘truth’ designates only the realist meaning. This
assumption is necessary for constructing a reasonable interpretation of their philosophy; without it the
fragments become obscure and unintelligible. The distinguished trend of skepticism in Presocratic philosophy
is characterized by various arguments which were later adopted and elaborated by the schools of Greek
skepticism. Most notable in introducing arguments against conventional opinions is Zeno of Elea. He was the
first to use paradoxes as Reduction ad Absurdum arguments aimed at refuting a given opinion. This style of
argumentation was later adopted by philosophers aiming at refuting the realist viewpoint, and one of the
paradoxes that was used for this is the Liar Paradox. The realist concept of truth was the philosophical opinion
that was referred to by the use of the word 'true' in the Liar Paradox. Now we can see how this concept
developed both historically and argumentatively.

4.

The Liar Paradox as a Reductio ad Absurdum argument

Even thought Aristotle presented the first full-developed theory of realism, he was still well aware of the
immense difficulties that the realist concept of truth faces. This fact is evident from the various connections in
which his many formulations of the logical principles appear. Some of his formulations of the principles of
contradiction and the excluded middle appear in his discussion of the possibility that there are descriptive
sentences that are neither true nor false, such as future contingent sentences. This kind of problem also
appears in Aristotle's discussion of the problematical principle of bivalence62.

4.1

The first indications of the problem of the Liar Paradox before Aristotle

Difficulties of this sort are, according to the proposed interpretation, the philosophical background for the
formulation of the Liar Paradox. The philosophical discussion in the fifth century BC on the details of the realist
viewpoint philosophically highlighted the difficulty of constructing a coherent synthesis of the conditions for the
realist concept of truth.
One piece of evidence for this difficulty is the discussion of the realist concept of truth in the dialogue
Euthydemus. As was noted, above, Plato was not aware of the Liar Paradox, but he clearly acknowledged the
problematic nature of the realist concept of truth. The brothers Euthydemus and Dionisodorus, the speakers in
this dialogue, assert that there cannot be a false proposition. The main stages in their argument are as follows:
The meaning of a proposition is acquired from its being a description of a given state of affairs. Accordingly, if
a false proposition does have a meaning, then it must refers to some state of affairs. Thus, if one can indicate
this state of affairs, then this proposition must be true. Therefore, if a given proposition does have a meaning,
it cannot be false. This conclusion, however, evidently presupposes a kind of a realist concept of truth in the
background, although much simpler than the one formulated by Aristotle63.
This counter-intuitive conclusion and its philosophical background are discussed at length in the
commentaries on Plato’s work. There is further evidence of this sort of philosophical discussion, in places
such as the writings of Prodicus of Ceos and Antisthenes of Athens. Their discussions clearly indicate the
difficulties necessarily faced by the realist concept of truth, but they are not mentioned much in the literature.
These two sources discuss the soundness of the Euthydemus’ counter-intuitive conclusion. This conclusion is

These two sources discuss the soundness of the Euthydemus’ counter-intuitive conclusion. This conclusion is
important, since an argument very similar to one half of the Liar Paradox can be extracted from it.
Consequently, these testimonies suggest when the problems underlying the Liar Paradox may have emerged,
dating them to the second half of the fifth century BC.
In one of the fragments attributed to Prodicus, he is said to have asserted that contradiction is impossible, and
it is explicitly stated that this is a paradox:
To Prodicus is attributed a paradoxical opinion: it is not possible to speak in contradiction64.

Not much is known about the details of the argument that are supposed to imply this conclusion. However, this
counter-intuitive conclusion is also attributed to Antisthenes of Athens, and this evidence supports what is
known about Prodicus:
"Contradiction is impossible", as Antisthenes said65.

Antisthenes derives this conclusion from a specific realist theory of truth, which he shares with Euthydemus
and Prodicus. According to Aristotle, Antisthenes’ theory of truth gives a particular content to the abstract and
schematic relation of correspondence. Antisthenes argues that there is a one-to-one relation between a
proposition and a given state of affairs, which is similar to the relation between a proper name and a given
object in the world66. Indeed, there is no sense in contradicting a proper name even in modern logical
systems. Diogenes Laertius notes:
He [Antisthenes] was the first to define a statement (or assertion) by saying that a statement is that which
sets forth what a thing was or is67.

Every proposition denotes a definite state of affairs. According to Aristotle, the conclusion that contradiction is
impossible is based on the following reasoning.
Premise (1)

The relation between a state of affairs and a proposition which
describes it is identical to the denotation relation between an object
and its proper name.

Premise (2)

Every true proposition denotes a state of affairs in the world.

Premise (3)

Only propositions that denote states of affairs in the world are
meaningful, just as only proper names that denote objects in the
world are meaningful.

Several corollaries follow from these premises:
Corollary (1)

If it is possible to contradict a true proposition, there are three
options: (1) The contradicted proposition denotes exactly the same
state of affairs that is denoted by the true proposition. (2) It denotes
another state of affairs. (3) It does not denote any state of affairs.

Corollary (1.1) If the contradicted proposition denotes exactly the same state of
affairs, then it is identical in its meaning to the original true
proposition, which is absurd.
Corollary (1.2) If the contradicted proposition denotes another state of affairs, then it
is not the contradiction of the original true proposition, but another
meaningful and true proposition.
Corollary (1.3) If the contradicted proposition does not denote any state of affairs,
then it is meaningless according to the premises.

then it is meaningless according to the premises.
Given the above premises and their corollaries, the conclusion is as follows:
Conclusion:

Contradiction is impossible.

What Prodicus' and Antisthenes' intentions were in constructing this counter-intuitive conclusion are unknown.
One thing, however, is clear: The emergence of such a counter-intuitive conclusion should induce doubts about
the realist framework that made the inference possible. If this conclusion is taken seriously and literally, then
the assumptions presupposed by realism turn out to be meaningless or otherwise false. The inference of this
conclusion should be taken seriously, since it is a conclusion of a valid argument, whose assumptions are part
of a specific correspondence theory of truth. The outcome can thus be a reason for rejecting the truth of these
assumptions and the specific content Prodicus and Antisthenes assign to the correspondence theory of truth.
This way of interpreting the philosophical consequences of their work is compatible with the philosophizing
that took place at the later stage of Greek skepticism: showing how the necessary presupposition of realism
implies doubtful consequences. An important part of this interpretation is that the above argument can be used
as a guideline for constructing another argument. The new argument remarkably resembles one half of the Liar
Paradox argument, which functions as yet another reason for doubting the acceptability of the realist viewpoint.
The argument, which is based on Antisthenes' reasoning, is given on the left side of the following table, while
its possible resemblance to one half of the Liar Paradox is given on the right.

The argument based on Antisthenes’
reasoning
(1) Premise

One half of the Liar Paradox

Suppose that the proposition ‘Contradiction
is impossible’ is meaningful and true.

Suppose that the
assertion ‘I am lying’ is
true

(2)
Corollary

According to the theory of truth discussed
by Antisthenes, the sentence ‘Contradiction
is impossible’ is true if and only if the state
of affairs is that contradiction is indeed
impossible. This has to be the case just as
with any other true but unquestionable
instance of the correspondent relation. For
instance, the sentence ‘Grass is green’ is
true if and only if grass is green.

According to the
correspondent relation,
the sentence ‘I am
lying’ is true if and only
if I am lying.

(3)
Corollary

If it is the case that contradiction is
impossible, then no sentence that refers to
contradiction can be meaningful in any way.
Therefore, the proposition ‘Contradiction is
impossible’ is meaningless, since it refers
to some characteristic of contradictions,
and consequently, according to
Antisthenes, it is false as well.

If the case is that I am
lying, then what has
been asserted is a lie,
and consequently, it is
not true that I was lying.

Conclusion:

If the proposition ‘Contradiction is
impossible’ is meaningful and true, it is

If the assertion ‘I am
lying’ is true, then it is

impossible’ is meaningful and true, it is
meaningless and thus false.

lying’ is true, then it is
false.

The argument on the left greatly resembles one half of the reasoning behind the Liar Paradox, as shown on the
right. The second half of the Liar Paradox does not evolve from Antisthenes' discussions, since the proposition
that contradiction is impossible is consistent with respect to their viewpoint, namely, if it is meaningless it is
false as well. The result is that the paradoxical way of arguing that distinguishes the Liar Paradox is hidden in
the discussions of Euthydemus, Prodicus and Antisthenes and is a consequence of the specific content they
give to realism. Although there is no evidence that they actually engaged in such a discussion, it is clear from
the above resemblance in argumentation that the philosophical atmosphere was ready for such a discussion.
The main point is that this kind of argument can be used as a refutation of the theory of truth suggested by
Prodicus and Antisthenes. Although their conclusion is not a full paradox, it obviously raises substantial doubts
for their version of a realist theory of truth. Their version of the correspondence theory of truth is known today to
be inadequate. Other ways of constructing much richer theories of truth are known today as well, in which
falsehood is possible and legitimate. Aristotle suggested such a theory, which deals with the metaphysical,
logical and semantic nature of predicates and objects in describing the correspondence concept of truth68.
However, the relevant conclusion here is the fact that the realist concept of truth has counter-intuitive
implications and this was already known in the fifth century. This tension gave rise to a variety of realist
theories of truth, most notably these of Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus and Stoicism. It also explains the
philosophical function of the Liar Paradox in Greek philosophy.

4.2

The formulation of the Liar Paradox

Discussing the premises that produce the Liar Paradox is the next stage in the speculation or story regarding
its philosophical function in the Megarian School. The formulation of the paradox by the Megarians is probably
close enough to the version given by Aristotle or at least close to it in its essence69. The Megarian version of
the paradox is as follows:
when somebody asserts "I am lying", he is at the same time telling the truth and lying70.

A necessary condition for the emergence of the paradox is that the Liar sentence ‘I am lying’ is a legitimate
truth-bearer according to Aristotle. This sentence indeed satisfies all the requirements for a factual proposition
(lógos apophantikós). Given this, the paradox is generated as was described above in the Introduction. The
function of the realist viewpoint can be seen now more clearly. The generation of the paradox presupposes the
realist concept of truth as defined by Aristotle, i.e., what is said by a true sentence must also be the case and
vice versa. The Aristotelian principle of the excluded middle is presupposed for the equivalence between ‘not
false’ and ‘true’, and the principle of contradiction is presupposed for deducing that the conclusion of the
paradox is self-contradiction and thus a logical absurdity71. The absurdity produced is therefore a logical
consequence of the necessary conditions for realism. These conditions are the correspondence concept of
truth and the logical principles that govern it. This way of formulating the paradox with its explicit reference to
the realist principles as the premises of the argument, is not merely a modern construction. It is very likely the
way the Megarians themselves saw it.

4.3
The inquiry method of Eubulides of Miletos and the Megarian School: dialectics and
the use of Reductio ad Absurdum
The interpretative problem regarding the Liar Paradox is that beyond the testimonies about Eubulides and the
Megarian School72, we do not know very much to help explain the function of paradoxes such as the Liar
Paradox in Greek philosophy of the fourth century. The next step in the proposed story is to examine the
relevant aspects of the Megarian School that led to the paradox. In this way, the proposed story will connect all
the known facts about the Megarian School into one scenario73.
It is known that many paradoxes, including the Liar Paradox, were first correctly formulated by the Megarian

It is known that many paradoxes, including the Liar Paradox, were first correctly formulated by the Megarian
School. They took an important part in their philosophical discussions. The Megarian School is known also for
the adoption of dialectics as the main philosophical inquiry method74. The common epithet of the school and
of some of its members was ‘the dialectician’ or ‘the refuter’75, meaning the use of the Reductio ad
Absurdum76. They had a reputation for involvement in philosophical controversies (erismoû) and producing
refutations of philosophical claims. According to Diogenes Laertius, Euclides and others members of the
school criticized philosophical arguments not by criticizing their premises, but by criticizing their conclusion
according to the Reductio form77. One member of the Megarian school, Alexinus of Alis, was known by the
epithet ‘the refuter’ (Élegxinos)78.
The Megarian school is further known for developing a logic of propositions that was entirely different from the
Aristotelian predicate logic, and was a source for the great logical achievements attributed to Stoicism. Three
important philosophers who are known for having developed original ideas in dialectics and logic were
members of the Megarian school: Eubulides, Diodorus Cronus of Iasus and Philo of Megara. However, only
one important philosopher from the Stoic school is known for original thinking on logical matters: Chrysippus of
Soli. Besides logic, the Megarian School is known for its philosophical ties with the metaphysics of the Eleatic
school. The school was influenced by Parmenides' metaphysics and the dialectics of Zeno of Elea, who
defended Parmenides’ metaphysics with dialectical arguments and paradoxes79. These may seem to be a
random collection of facts, but connecting them will provide the key to the philosophical function of the Liar
Paradox.
The main point is to see the connection between the paradoxes' role in dialectical methodology and their
function in metaphysical inquiry. The key is the concept ‘dialectics’ in fourth-century Greek philosophy80.
According to Aristotle, "dialectics" is a collective term for argument forms that were designed for examining
the truth-value of premises, which are not necessarily true or evident81. One of the examples that were present
before Aristotle’s analysis was the Platonic dialogue82. Plato classified assumptions whose truth-values are
to be dialectically investigated, as ‘hypotheses’. According to his dialectical method, hypotheses are
examined by questioning the adequacy of the conclusions derived from them. If the conclusion is impossible,
the hypothesis from which it was derived is rejected. Aristotle notes that the Reductio ad Impossible argument
form is a kind of derivation ‘ex hypothesi’ and summarizes this kind of hypothetical argument as follows:
Everyone who carries out a proof per Impossibile proves the false conclusion by syllogism and demonstrates
the point at issue ex hypothesi when an impossible conclusion follows from the assumption of the
contradictory proposition. E.g., one proves that the diagonal of a square is incommensurable with the sides by
showing that if it is assumed to be commensurable, odd become equal to even numbers. Thus he argues to
the conclusion that odd becomes equal to even, and proves ex hypothesi that the diagonal is
incommensurable, since the contradictory proposition produces a false result. For we saw that to reach a
logical conclusion per Impossibile is to prove some conclusion impossible on account of the original
assumption83.

There is no prior acceptance of the truth-value of the hypothesis in the use of the Reductio ad Impossibile,
only the prior agreement to reject it based on the success of the argument. The reason for this, according to
Aristotle, is "because the fallacy [of the conclusion] is obvious."84 This philosophical methodology is therefore
a negative one of refutation, the rejection of a hypothesis because of its impossible conclusion85. Its logical
form is as follows:
Given a set of premises D
A given argument:

A decision regarding the
acceptability of the conclusion:
The final conclusion, based on

Therefore: the conclusion is:
a
But it is impossible that a

The final conclusion, based on
(a) the given argument and

Therefore, not-D

(b) the decision regarding the
conclusion of that argument.
The core of a proof by Reductio ad Impossibile is that "to reach a logical conclusion per Impossibile is to
prove some conclusion impossible on account of the original assumption"86. Given the traditional difference
between Reduction ad Absurdum and Reduction ad Impossibile87, the Liar Paradox should be a classified
as a Reductio ad Impossibile, since in this Reductio argument the conclusion is "either a refutation or a
paradox"88. For simplicity, however, this distinction will not be maintained in the following.

4.4

The Reductio ad Absurdum argument form

Regarding Megarian logic, the use of the argument form of Reductio ad Absurdum necessitates the use of
logic of propositions, which defines in precise terms the logical behavior of hypothetical propositions. The
Megarians had to develop such a logic in order to use dialectics, and it is known that the school and some of
their pupils, who founded the Stoic school, were engaged in such inquiries89. Various philosophers from the
Megarian School were known for their logical and mathematical skills, such as the founder of the school,
Euclides of Megara. Others were heads of the school, such as Stilpo of Megara, Diodorus Cronus of Iasus
and Philo of Megara. From the little that is known about the last three it is evident that they had a genuine and
deep understanding of some logical problems which are still unsolved and disturb modern logicians. The
accepted opinion is that the source of the fundamental conceptual achievements of Stoic logic, as well as the
basic principles of dialectics regarding entailment and refutation, is the logical work done by the Megarian
School90.
One interesting source for the analysis of the Reductio ad Absurdum argument form is an enigmatic passage
found in the Prior Analytics91. It also shows the importance of the logic of propositions for the dialectical
method developed by the Megarian School. This passage shows the tremendous difficulty of follow the
dialectical method only with the aid of syllogistic logic. In this passage, Aristotle criticizes the Reductio ad
Impossibile argument form as part of his discussion of the issue that a proposition and its negation cannot
both imply the same conclusion92. The starting point for his discussion is the following argument form:
(1)

Given that a , then it is necessary that b

Premise

(2)

Given that not-a , then it is necessary that b

Premise

\

(3)

Given that not-b , then it is necessary that not-a

Contraposition,
193

\

(4)

Given that not-b , then it is necessary that b

Transitivity, 2,394

Aristotle claims, however, that conclusion (4) is absurd and impossible, and therefore premises (1) and (2)
cannot both be true. However, he is surely wrong, since as long as ‘b ’ is a true proposition, (1) and (2) are
consistent. The first question is why Aristotle thought that this argument criticizes the Reductio ad Impossibile.
The answer is that lines (1) to (4) connect the following propositions:
(a)

Given that not-b , then it is necessary that not-a .

(b)

Given that not-b , then it is necessary that a.

From lines (a) and (b) one can move to lines (1) and (2) with the principle of Contraposition, and then derive
the conclusion:
\

(5)

It is necessary that b .

from line (4)95. However, the argument whose premises follow the form of (a) and (b) and whose conclusion
follows the form of (5) is a Reductio ad Absurdum. That is, if the hypothesis that not-b implies a contradiction
(i.e., that a and not-a ), then it is necessary that b . It turns out, then, that Aristotle is referring here to the
Reductio ad Absurdum argument form, and in other words, to the dialectical methodology. However, this is a
valid argument in propositional logic, as it was developed and used by the Megarian and the Stoic schools.
Although it cannot be translated easily into a syllogistic form within Aristotelian logic, it is nonetheless valid.
The second question now arises: In what sense is this a criticism? It seems that Aristotle intended to reject this
form of reasoning because it is absurd, but eventually gives valuable evidence for its validity. What can be
learned from this passage is the formal proof of the validity of the Reductio ad Absurdum. Perhaps Aristotle's
restriction to syllogistic logic was the source of his mistake, since propositional logic is needed for a full logical
understanding of the Reductio ad Absurdum. In any case, Aristotle’s treatment in this issue is a puzzle for
scholars96. The important thing for the present purpose is that a fourth-century testimony describes in detail
some of the logic behind the dialectical method.
In the Megarian School, as in Greek philosophy in general, logic was not an independent and autonomous
subject, but an integral part of philosophy and philosophical inquiry97. The extensive investigations in logic by
the Megarian School were an integral part of their metaphysical investigations and their dialectical
methodology. A commitment to dialectics as a philosophizing method and an interest in metaphysics are
interwoven in the formulation of the Liar Paradox by Eubulides. It was used as the conclusion of an argument
whose contradictory nature leads to the refutation of the argument’s premises98. The paradox turns thus into
an important philosophical insight, since the hypothesis which is questioned by the argument is, in its Platonic
sense, a reasonable and acknowledged philosophical thesis.

4.5

The logical justification of the validity of the Reductio Argument

The proposed story about the Liar Paradox as part of a Reductio argument is further supported by analyzing
its logical characteristics according to Megarian-Stoic logic. The logical basis for this refutation is given by
Megarian dialectics, which can throw some light on its nature99. An argument of the Reduction ad Absurdum
form, such as the one discussed here, is one in which the truth of the premises is under dispute. The premises
are agreed upon for the sake of establishing the conclusion, and their truthfulness is only stipulated or
conditionally assumed100. However, in view of the absurdity of the conclusion, the premises are rejected. This
delicate logical move is justifiable in terms of Megarian-Stoic logic.
The whole logical point is that the dialectical move of refutation constitutes a valid argument that has a
necessary false conclusion. According to Megarian-Stoic logic, an argument is valid (sunaktilós or peravtikós)
when the conditional proposition with the conjunction of the premises as antecedent and the conclusion as
consequent is true101.
The conditional proposition should be true according to Diodorus Cronus' definition of a true conditional, and
in modern modal terms that means necessarily true102. The semantic corollary is that an argument is valid
when the negation (antikeímenon) of its conclusion is inconsistent (máchomai) with the conjunction
(sumpeplegménon) of its premises103. This is, however, not a definition of validity, but only the criterion for
validity. The point is that according to Megarian-Stoic logic, an argument of the Reductio ad Absurdum form
is a valid but false argument (pheûdos); that is, a valid argument with a false conjunction of premises104. It is
clear that at least one of its premises is false because of the necessary falsehood of the conclusion.
According to Megarian-Stoic logic, the validity of any argument is justified formally by logical analysis. A given

According to Megarian-Stoic logic, the validity of any argument is justified formally by logical analysis. A given
argument is reduced to a series of arguments built up from the five undemonstrated (i.e., evident,
anapódeiktos) argument forms. The arguments of the five fundamental types are called "undemonstrated",
because they do not need to be demonstrated (apodeiktikós) "owing to its being immediately clear in their
case that they are valid (sunágousin)"105. The reason for also calling these arguments "simple" is that their
conclusions "follow immediately from their premises". Sextus Empiricus introduces his discussion of the five
undemonstrated arguments or inference-schemata (schêma) as follows:
... the undemonstrated arguments which the Stoics talk so much about... are the arguments which they say
need no proof for their own construction and themselves serve as proofs of the validity of the other
arguments... They envision many undemonstrated arguments, but they set out in particular the following five,
to which all the rest are thought to be referred106.

Sextus then lists the five types. He says, "and if they are rejected, the whole of dialectics is overthrown" and
Cicero says that this series of undemonstrated argument forms or inference-schemes constitutes the whole of
dialectics107.
The Liar argument is founded on the falsehood of a consequent that was validity derived from a set of
necessary presuppositions for realism, which in its turn is the reason for the rejection of the antecedent all
together. This refutation move is primarily based on the second type of the undemonstrated arguments:108

aÉb
~b

Sextus Empiricus: "That is, when an argument has two premises, of which
the one is a conditional and the other is the contradictory of the consequent
of the conditional, and also has as its conclusion the contradictory of the
antecedent, then such an argument is a type two undemonstrated
argument".

~a
This scheme is the basis for considering the Liar Paradox a part of a Reductio ad Absurdum refutation
argument. The variable ‘b’ is replaced by the proposition that the sentence ‘I am lying’ can have a truth-value
and ‘a’ is the conjunction of necessary conditions to realism. However, ‘b’ is necessarily rejected due to the
Liar Paradox and the conclusion is that the set of conditions represented by ‘a ’ cannot be consistent, and thus
at least one of these conditions must be false. It is important to note that in the formulation of this scheme in the
ancient texts it is stated that the consequent is contradicted (antikeímenon) and not just a negation
(apophatikós) of a proposition. This gives more weight to the use of paradoxes as a basis for refuting the
hypothesis in the antecedent. Otherwise, the consequent is nothing more than a contingent false proposition,
which cannot constitutes a full refutation move.
Given the validity of the Liar argument, the rational choice is clear as well. It is based on the third type of
undemonstrated argument:109
~(aÙb)
a

Sextus Empiricus: "Thirdly, the argument which, from a negative
conjunction and one of the conjuncts, concludes to the negation of the
other".

~b
Realism and the proposition that the sentence ‘I am lying’ can have a truth-value cannot be both true and
cannot constitute a consistent set. The meaning is that one can infer the two contradictory propositions, i.e.,
that the Liar sentence is true and that it is false, from assuming the truthfulness of realism. This situation is, as
was shown above, the reason for eventually rejecting the truthfulness of realism. What is needed now is to
show, according to Megarian-Stoic logic, the justification for the reduction of this argument to a series built up
out of the five undemonstrated argument forms. In Megarian-Stoic logic the validity of an argument is shown

out of the five undemonstrated argument forms. In Megarian-Stoic logic the validity of an argument is shown
through analysis. The "analysis" of an argument means the procedure of reducing a given argument to a series
of the basic undemonstrated arguments. Megarian-Stoic logic had at least four general rules (themata) by
which these analyses were supposed to be carried out. The basic justification for the validity of the Liar
argument is the inference-schema "the argument from two conditionals" (dià dúo tropikûn):111
aÉb

Sextus Empiricus: "If the first, the first; if not the first, the first; either the first
or not the first; therefore the first".

aÉ~b
bÚ~b
~a
To form the refuting argument, ‘a’ has to be replaced by the conjunction of the necessary conditions for
realism. The variable ‘b’ has to be replaced by the proposition that the Liar sentence can have a truth-value,
i.e., the sentence ‘I am lying’ is either true or false.
Assume for the sake of argument that this refutation move is acceptable. If so, then it is a discovery that a
paradox was hidden in the realist doctrine all the time, as it is certainly not prima facie evident. A logical
analysis of the internal connections between realism and the Liar Paradox was needed for exposing it. The
Megarian and the Stoics were well aware that sometimes an act of exposing non-evident conclusions is
needed. This constitutes one of the four general rules (themata) - the dialectical theorem (theúrema):
If we have premises, which yield a conclusion, then we have in effect also this conclusion among the
premises, even if it is not explicitly stated.115

This rule, along with the other three, was used to prove the demonstrability of an argument. However, this rule
has a special importance for the current discussion, since it is the reason for demonstrating the internal
inconsistency of realism.
The dialectical conclusion that realism is internally inconsistent is certainly controversial. Assuming it is right,
however, it certainly constitutes a "discovery" that was made possible by the use of logic. The conclusion is,
however, not an evident one and is surely in need of demonstration. Megarian-Stoic logic distinguishes
between valid arguments that have pre-evident conclusions, and others that have non-evident ones. Some of
the valid arguments that have non-evident conclusions merely "proceed" to their conclusions (ephodeutikûs),
but the Liar Paradox presents a more subtle case. The Liar argument is an example of an argument that,
according to Megarian-Stoic logic, proceeds "by way of discovery". Logic and dialectics serve here to reveal
a non-evident conclusion:
An argument, which by means of what is more clearly apprehended [i.e., the undemonstrated five types],
concludes that which is less clearly apprehended.

The Liar argument is a non-evident and non-simple argument that has to do with discovering something about
realism. The above analysis of the argument into its components proves in Megarian-Stoic terms its validity
and turns the refutation of realism into an evident conclusion.

4.6

Supporting evidence: The Paradox of Menedemus of Eretria

As was said earlier, there is no explicit and direct evidence that the Megarian School held philosophical
discussions about the Liar Paradox. There is, however, indirect evidence that coincides well with the
proposed interpretation here. The evidence is about a paradox formulated by Menedemus of Eretria, which
has a striking similarity with the Liar Paradox. The way the paradox was formulated in the Reductio ad
Absurdum form is known. However, what is more important is that the philosophical theory that was the object

of the criticism is also known.
Menedemus studied at the Megarian School and admired his teacher, Stilpo of Megara, the third head of the
school116. Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the following paradox of Menedemus was
formulated and discussed according to the dialectical tradition that he studied at the Megarian School. The
Menedemus paradox is:
When he [Menedemus] heard that Alexinus often praised him, he said 'And I'm always chiding Alexinus; so Alexinus
must be a bad man, since he either praises a bad man, or is chided by a good one.117

It is not the Liar Paradox, but the way it was generated and its paradoxical nature are similar to those of the
Liar Paradox. In contrast to the Liar Paradox, however, the philosophical context in which this paradox was
formulated by Menedemus is known. The first stage, therefore, is to see what theory was supposed to be
refuted by Menedemus' paradox.
The background for the formulation of the paradox is a specific theory of correspondence; much similar to the
theory advocated by Prodicus and Antisthenes118. Namely, that there is a one-to-one relation between simple
or atomic propositions and facts, and so each proposition stands for itself as an autonomous unit of meaning
and designation119. This theory is one of the meanings that can be assigned to the schematic relation of
correspondence and the realist concept of truth. Furthermore, it is a legitimate candidate for a realist theory of
meaning. The necessary conditions formulated by Aristotle for the realist concept of truth are schematic and
general, and can thus conform to several correspondence theories of truth. The Menedemus paradox can now
be shown as a Reductio ad Absurdum of this theory of meaning. The theory’s consequences are used as
premises for generating the paradox, just as was frequently done in the dialectical philosophizing of the
Megarian School120.
The sentences that constitute the paradox are "Alexinus is bad" and "Menedemus is good". They are
paradigmatic instances of appropriate sentences according to the said theory: Atomic, simple and positive
sentences that can maintain a rigid name Þ fact relation between language and reality. Menedemus’ paradox
is generated as follows: Menedemus asserts "Alexinus is bad" while Alexinus asserts "Menedemus is good".
The assumption is that a good person praises only good people and condemns only bad ones, and
conversely, a bad person praises only bad people and condemns only good ones. Now, if Menedemus is
good, then according to his condemnation of Alexinus it turns out that Alexinus is bad. If Alexinus is indeed
bad, then his praise of Menedemus turns Menedemus into a bad person. Therefore, the first half of the
paradox is ‘if Menedemus is good, then he is bad’. On the other hand, if Menedemus is bad, then from his
condemnation of Alexinus it turns out that Alexinus is good. If indeed Alexinus is good, then from his praise of
Menedemus it turns out that Menedemus is good. Therefore, the second half of the paradox is ‘if Menedemus
is bad then he is good’. The conclusion, drawn from the conjunction of the two halves, is ‘Menedemus is good
if and only if he is bad’. This paradox is parallel to the Liar Paradox in the following formulation:
Menedemus: "Alexinus is lying".
Alexinus: "Menedemus is telling the truth".
If the argumentative form of Menedemus’ paradox is applied to this pair of sentences as well, then the
consequence will be ‘Menedemus is telling the truth if and only if he is lying’.
By the use of the Reductio ad Absurdum Menedemus showed that the realist theory of meaning under
discussion is inconsistent. The Menedemus paradox supports the proposed interpretation in two aspects: the
philosophical nature of the Liar Paradox and its role in the refutation of realism.
In this way, the description given by Cicero in his Academica (see section 2, above) regarding the nature of
the Liar Paradox and its function in late Greek skepticism agrees with much other evidence. If the above
interpretation of the philosophical nature of the Liar Paradox and its role in the Megarian School is correct,

interpretation of the philosophical nature of the Liar Paradox and its role in the Megarian School is correct,
then the way to its assimilation in the later stages of Greek skepticism is short121.

5.
Examining the proposed story about the Liar Paradox in Greek skepticism: attempts
by realist philosophers to block or to solve the Liar Paradox
One of the best supports for the proposed interpretation to the Liar Paradox is the effort of philosophers with
realist outlook to block or to solve the Liar Paradox. There are two parties to the controversy over realism.
Namely, the Megarian School and late skepticism on the one hand, and the realist philosophers, such as
Aristotle and Chrysippus of Soli, on the other hand. They differed in the way they discussed the paradox and
understood its implications. Given any paradox formulated as part of a refuting argument, there are at least
two opposing approaches:
(1)The first approach was held by the Megarian school and Greek skepticism in
general. They used the paradox for pointing out an internal inconsistency in the realist
outlook, implying necessary falsehood of some of the premises which entail it. It was
constructed as such for exposing the inherent inconsistency in realism. The result is the
rejection of realism, since all the premises needed to its emergence are necessary
conditions. Therefore, the paradox is not a given problem that should be solved, but is
an indication to the logical and rational necessity of rejecting at least one of the
premises that lead to its emergence. Its formulation is the philosophical achievement.
(2)The second approach was held by philosophers with a realist outlook, such as
Aristotle and Chrysippus. They faced the rational challenge of refuting their most
fundamental presuppositions. If they chose to maintain the realist outlook, they had to
find a way to invalidate the paradox. They had to focus on the paradoxical inference in
order to find a flaw that would destroy its validity and rescue the threatened
assumptions. In their view the philosophical achievement would be solving the paradox
or showing why it is not a paradox after all. A reasonable justification for this approach
can be, for instance, that realism has significant advantages that are independent of
the question of the Liar Paradox.
In view of this distinction, a refutation test in the Popperian sense can be constructed for the proposed
interpretation. The interpretation predicts that realist philosophers would attack the inference and try to show
why it cannot be seen as a valid Reductio ad Absurdum argument after all.

5.1

Aristotle’s solution of the Liar Paradox

Aristotle’s discussion of the Liar Paradox is very brief, but it nonetheless contains one of the more impressive
solutions. This discussion appears in On Sophistical Refutations, the last book in the Topics, which
discusses invalid inferences122. It is part of the Aristotle’s non-formal discussion of logic, dealing with various
sorts of practical arguments. Aristotle’s main claim is that the Liar Paradox should be classified in the
category of fallacies. What is implied from his discussion is that no serious threat is involved since the Liar
Paradox is no more than a fallacy that results from the faulty use of inference rules123. The fallacy is created
by an unrestricted use of concepts, that should be used only in a limited way, taking into consideration various
factors such as context, place, time or relations between concepts124. This kind of fallacy also appears it the
context of ethics. There, Aristotle asks whether it is possible for a man to keep his promise and break it at the
same time, and discusses the possibility of a man swearing to break his promise125. Immediately after this,
he claims that this situation is similar to that of the Liar Paradox:
The argument is similar which deals with the question whether the same man can say what is at the same
time both true and false; but it presents apparent difficulties because it is not easy to see whether the
qualification 'absolutely' should be applied to 'true' or to 'false'. But there is no reason why the same man
should not be absolutely a liar yet tell the truth in some respects, or that some of a man's words should be
true but he himself not be truthful.126

Aristotle asks whether a man who asserts "I am lying" is uttering a proposition that is true and false at the
same time. Aristotle assumes that it is a specific sort of fallacy, thus, providing a way of solving the paradox. It
thus seems that the solution to the Liar Paradox according to Aristotle is based on the observation that not
every use of the concept ‘true’ or ‘false’ is an absolute one. There are propositions, which can be true only in
certain aspect (mê) or relations (tinós). That is, they are true for certain things but not absolutely true. In other,
complementary aspects, they are false. On the other hand, such propositions can also be false in all their
aspects.
In the modern view, Aristotle's analysis of the Liar Paradox is not considered a satisfying solution.
Nonetheless, it is clear that Aristotle understood the importance of the problem as it was posed by the
Megarian School. He notes that it is a difficult problem, which eludes any satisfactory solution. In light of this
recognition in the importance of the problem, one may ask why Aristotle did not attempt to find a more
comprehensive solution.
The Liar Paradox is not the only problem resulting from a realist theory of truth. For instance, Aristotle is aware
of the problem of propositions with undetermined truth-value, as in future contingent propositions and the
question of fatalism127. He devotes an extensive discussion to this problem and proposes an analysis and a
serious approach for constructing a solution. Some of Aristotle's insights are instructive for discussions of
these problems even today. However, it is clear that there is no comparison between the philosophical scope
and profundity of his detailed discussions of free will and fatalism and his scanty mention of the Liar Paradox.
There is no comparison between the serious solution proposed for the former problem and the faulty one
proposed for the Liar Paradox. However, Aristotle’s silence should be given as much philosophical
importance as his attention. The problem he faced touches directly upon those logical and metaphysical
principles that guide the behavior of the realist concept of truth, whose validity was evident to Aristotle.

5.2

Chrysippus of Soli's solution of the Liar Paradox

Chrysippus of Soli proposed the second known solution to the Liar Paradox in Greek philosophy. His solution,
like that of Aristotle, focuses on finding a possible cause for the invalidity of the argument.
The [fallacy] about the truth-speaker and similar ones are to be… [solved in a similar way]. One should not
say that they say true and [also] false; nor should one conjecture in another way, that the same [statement] is
expressive of true and false simultaneously, but that they have no meaning at all. And he rejects the aforementioned proposition and also the proposition that one can say true and false simultaneously and that in all
such [matters] the sentence is something simple [i.e., a legitimate atomic proposition], sometimes expressive
of more.128

Chrysippus was a realist philosopher, and the Stoic theories of truth and meaning are realist in nature.
Propositions are true because of their correspondence to objective reality, and like Aristotle, the Stoics had a
list of necessary conditions for the realist concept of truth.129
Given the realism advocated by the Stoics, it is clear why Chrysippus tried to find a solution that would prevent
the emergence of the paradox, just as Aristotle had done. The solution Chrysippus proposed was to deny the
legitimacy of the Liar sentence as a truth-bearer, claiming that it is a meaningless linguistic expression130.
Chrysippus explicitly rejects the possibility that the assertion of the Liar sentence is the assertion of a
proposition which is true and false at the same time. This objection shows that Chrysippus, like Aristotle, was
well aware of the destructive power of the paradoxical conclusion for the logical and metaphysical principles
underlying realism. Chrysippus rejected the solution proposed by Aristotle, and it is reasonable to assume that
this was due to Aristotle’s clear failure to solve the problem.
However, according to the modern views of the semantic paradoxes, even Chrysippus’ solution fails. The most
similar modern solution is that proposed by Saul Kripke and Bas Van Fraassen131. This solution is based on
the idea of "gaps" between truth-values and the idea of groundedness. However, like that of Chrysippus, this
theory of truth do not constitute a conclusive and complete solution to the Liar Paradox. It is more ad hoc

theory of truth do not constitute a conclusive and complete solution to the Liar Paradox. It is more ad hoc
solutions than genuine ones. Their only justification is the prevention of the paradox; they do not have any
contribution of independent value to semantics.
This conclusion was clear to the ancient philosophers. Cicero notes that Chrysippus discussed various
paradoxes, but did not succeed in solving them132. Cicero enumerates several difficulties in Chrysippus’
solution. The common characteristic is that Chrysippus did not show why the Liar sentence is not a legitimate
substitution in the correspondence relation. The fact that its substitution leads to a paradox cannot be seen as
a reason to disqualify it as a legitimate truth-bearer. Without independent reasons for disqualifying the
sentence, Chrysippus’ solution is ad hoc.

5.3

An anonymous solution of the Liar Paradox

There is a third common reaction to the Liar Paradox, which is mentioned by Cicero and others. It is a
response which says that the Liar Paradox in counter-intuitive; that it opposes the common intuitions about the
use of the words ‘true’ and ‘false’. This kind of rejection of the paradox is similar to the common rejection of
other critical arguments of skepticism133. For instance, the main response to Prodicus' opinion claim that
speaking in contradiction is impossible is:
It goes against what all people believe and think, for all people have conversations in which they speak in
contradiction, both in ordinary life and in doing philosophy134.

Even Cicero, who should know better, concludes his Academica by saying that from now on philosophers
should talk about positive issues. They should seek the truth instead of discussing the negative claims of the
skeptics about the deception of the senses, the traps of the soreítes and the Liar Paradoxes135. An overall
rejection of skepticism because its critical claims conflict with ordinary intuitions is certainly not serious.
Skepticism in general, and Greek skepticism in particular, do not oppose these intuitions. Pyrrhonist
skepticism and the skeptical Academy explicitly argued that the skeptical criticism should not be understood
as rejection of ordinary life and its constitutive beliefs. The subject matter of skeptical criticism is philosophical
theories dealing with abstract metaphysical and epistemological issues136. From the point of view of
skepticism, realism is a philosophical theory which purport to teach about the true nature of reality, even if this
reality is hidden. The philosophical target of the Liar Paradox is thus the metaphysical theory of realism and
not the common use of the word ‘true’.
The difference between the two approaches to the Liar Paradox is thus a normative difference: It involves the
rational implications one is forced to accept due to the existence of a paradox. All the attempts to disqualify
the Liar argument that were discussed above share a commitment to rationality, but this commitment is
expressed differently depending upon the individual purposes of each of the figures. While skeptics conclude
by claiming that realism is consistent, realists conclude by disqualifying some aspect of the argument. The
difference, then, is the result of the difference in philosophical aims.

6.
How skepticism understands the Liar Paradox, and in what sense it dissolves the
paradox?
Cicero presents a metaphor was used by the skeptics, in which they compared the Liar Paradox to the story of
Penelope, Odysseus' wife. Since Odysseus was long absent from his palace, one hundred and twenty idle
suitors, convinced that Odysseus was dead, were lying siege to Queen Penelope, wasting his patrimony and
eating her out of house and home. Penelope, being faithful to Odysseus, fought off the suitors. She said she
could make no decision until she had finished weaving a shroud for Laertes, her father-in-law. For three years,
she wove by day and unpicked the cloth by night.
The Liar Paradox is an argument and thus follows logic and truth-valued semantics. However, pure logical or
semantical investigation of the paradox would miss the whole point. Just as the intention of Penelope's
weaving was not to prepare a shroud, so the Liar Paradox was created for totally different purpose than is
apparent at first glance. The Liar Paradox is a dialectical move with metaphysical aims, and thus
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understanding it only as a fallacious argument misses the point. Furthermore, as it is clear that the paradox is
not fallacious for the usual reasons, the question regarding the nature of its destructive force naturally arises.
The perpetual unstitching of the cloth is an accurate symbol for the destructive force the paradox has for more
than two thousand years. Every attempt to solve the paradox based on an examination of its features had led
invariably to revisions of the paradox, which strengthened it as a perpetual obstacle confronting any realist
concept of truth. The original Liar Paradox has many modern improved versions that make it almost hopeless
for the realist to believe that it will ever be solved137. In this sense, the Liar Paradox, like many other
troublesome traditional skeptical arguments, is a refutation with epistemological and metaphysical
implications. From this perspective, there is no sense in trying to find a solution to the paradox only on logical
or semantical considerations. The paradox is not a given problematic fact, a semantical one in this case,
which has to be solved. The more appropriate approach is one used in other general skeptical arguments. In
this sense, the efforts of Aristotle and Chrysippus are similar to modern attempts to solve the paradox. They
are unavailing in the same way as attempts to block the skeptical dream argument along logical or semantical
lines, as if all there is in this argument is the misuse of logical principles or violation of semantical norms. In the
perspective of skepticism the Liar Paradox ceases to be a problem in need of a solution, and turns into a
challenge whose implications must be squarely confronted. It is no longer considered merely a fallacious
argument for which the philosophical challenge is to find exactly why it is fallacious. In this respect, skepticism
is an acceptance of the implications, and the acceptance constitutes its positive aspects, namely, the
proposal for an anti-realist concept of truth and an appropriate epistemology.

6.1

Guiding principles for an anti-realist concept of truth in Greek skepticism

Greek skeptics, especially those in skeptical Academy, were not satisfied only with negative philosophizing,
but also tried to develop positive proposals. As against the principles that constitute realism and its concept of
truth, the skeptic philosophers introduced alternative anti-realist principles. Arguments such as the Liar
argument were aimed at the rejection of realist principles, but at the same time indirectly supported and
advanced anti-realist principles. Two of these anti-realist principles have a direct bearing on the implications
of the Liar Paradox. The first is the Protagorean Principle of Equivalence, which is also known as the Ou
Mallon principle. It states that there are cases in which judgment must be suspended due to the impossibility
of determining the truth-value of contradictory propositions. The second principle is part of the sophist teaching
of arguments and counter-arguments, part of their typical emphasis on the contradictory conclusions held by
rival philosophical schools. This tradition is summarized in a work by an unknown author, entitled Double
Arguments (dissoí lógoi).
The epistemological question that underlies the Ou Mallon principle and Double Arguments is whether truth in
the realist concept is accessible. The skeptics' negative answer to this question constitutes a claim that the
realist viewpoint cannot be maintained. Discussions of this question were prevalent in the skeptical Academy,
providing a background for formulating and using the Liar Paradox. Skepticism offers constructive arguments
that focus on showing the epistemological limitations of human knowledge, but those arguments are preceded
by negative ones of the Reductio ad Absurdum form, which focus on refuting the basic assumptions of
realism138. The main consequence of these arguments is showing, from the point of view of realism itself, that
there is an inconsistency inherent in the realist doctrine, and so the conceptual scheme of realism cannot be
maintained.
However, can the Liar Paradox perhaps have destructive effects on skepticism as well? It should be
remembered that powerful skeptic arguments can some times be reversed, so as to invalidate the doctrines
held by those who formulated them in the first place139. The two anti-realist principles of the Ou Mallon and of
the work Double Arguments assure that this cannot occur with the Liar Paradox.

6.2

The Protagorean principle of Equivalence - The Ou Mallon Principle

The Principle of Equivalence is basic to the epistemology of Democritus and Protagoras, was later adopted
by Greek skepticism140. This principle states that for a given pair of propositions, 'p' and 'q', the epistemic
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situation is ‘Not (rather p then q)’ or, more exactly, ‘Not (rather p than q)’ is compatible with ‘q rather than p’. It
denotes a sort of indifference or equivalence between ‘p’ and ‘q’. According to Aristotle's presentation of the
principle, the human senses are at odd with one another in a variety of familiar ways, and the variations in
sense experiences may well lead one to the following conclusion:
Thus it is uncertain which of these impressions are true or false; for one kind is no more true than another, but
equally so. And hence Democritus says that either there is no truth or we cannot discover it. [68A112]141

Nausiphanes, a student of Democritus and teacher of Epicurus, rephrased his teacher's saying as follows:
On the things which seem to be, none is rather than is not. [75B4]

The intended use of the Ou Mallon principle is epistemological. It states the possibility of equivalence in the
justification of logically contradictory propositions. Namely, one judgment is no more true than another if the
evidence for each judgment is equally good. It is important to note that the Ou Mallon does not state that the
two propositions are identical in every aspect. It only states that there is no way of determining which one is
true and which one is false in the realist sense of truth and falsity. The reason this may happen is that human
knowledge is limited and the senses are unreliable. If the truthfulness of a proposition cannot be supported
conclusively, then belief in it cannot be justified. Therefore, its negation can be equally (un)justified. However,
the Ou Mallon principle does not negate the principle of contradiction, and consequently it does not imply that
one can rationally believe in a proposition and in its negation as true beliefs. The principle states that there are
cases which are undecidable and nothing more.

6.3

Double Arguments (Dissoí Lógoi)

Another indication of the anti-realist stance is an anonymous work dated from the beginning of the fourth
century, at about 400 BC, entitled Double Arguments or Dissoí Lógoi142. This work does not support a
specific point of view, but examines theses and anti-theses or philosophical polarities. It is a sort of an
exercise in demonstrating that there are two sides to every question. The debates presented in the work are
similar to Protagorean teachings, which are said to have appeared in the Art of Eristics and two other books
dedicated to the Refutatory Arguments by Protagoras:
[Protagoras] was the first to say that there were two contradictory arguments [logoi] about everything,
opposite to one another. [80B6a]143

The emphasis is on the arguments, or more generally, the reasons, for accepting or rejecting a given belief.
Protagoras was known to be an acute arguer:
Protagoras says that on every issue it is possible for it to be argued with equal force on both sides. [80A20]

Aristotle naturally discussed the subject from the realist viewpoint. He was not the only realist to do so,
however, as this tension pervades the controversy over the realist concept of truth. This tension was central to
Greek philosophy from its beginning in the Presocratic period onward.
The text of the Double Arguments is incomplete but its content is fairly clear. Its main thesis is that
contradictory propositions (antilégein) with comparable plausibility can be raised in various contexts. It is an
example of the practice of relativism characteristic of the Sophists, as satirized by Aristophanes and Plato.
Taken seriously, however, the work is a kind of instruction manual for ways of rejecting the possibility that
realist truth is epistemologically accessible. It is in the Sophist, skeptical tradition of arguments and counterarguments, of emphasizing contradictory conclusions held by philosophical schools, and of dual arguments for
and against a given proposition. The relevant discussion for the present purpose occurs in Chapter Four,
which deals with the failure to establish realist, objective, certain truth:
The fourth ‘twofold argument’ deals with true and false: that they are the same, and that they are different. [p.
420]

The forth antinomy introduces a thesis and an antithesis: the realist and the anti-realist concepts of truth. The
thesis is that the concept of truth is a realist one and is based on two main assumptions. The first assumption
is that the concept of truth is a correspondent and objective one, since truth is a correspondence with an
independent reality.
... the same statement is true or false according to whether it corresponds with the facts.

If reality is as described by a proposition, then this proposition is true, and if reality is different, then it is false.
Furthermore, the concept of truth is objective:
So that the same words when falsehood is present are false, and when truth is present are true (just as a
person is the same whether boy, youth, man or old man).

The truth-value of a proposition depends on its intrinsic falsehood or truth, rather than the epistemological
limitations of human cognition. The second assumption is that the concept of truth is ruled by the principles of
contradiction and the excluded middle. A proposition cannot be true and false at the same time, and it can only
be true or false.144
This text is the starting-point for more advanced discussions of the possibility of an anti-realist concept of truth,
one that would reject the total dependence of a proposition’s truth-value on an objective state of affairs. The
antithesis raised by the fourth antinomy is that truth is an anti-realist, relativist concept; accordingly, a
proposition may be true in some contexts and false in others. The antithesis is introduced in an example taken
from the law courts. It is insightful because it is not clear when the facts end and the description begins, and
thus interpretation becomes essential.
If the things stated have actually happened, the story is true; if not, it is false. But the jury are examining, not
the events (for they were not present) but the stories told of the events; so that the stories themselves differ
according to whether truth or falsehood is mingled with them.

The principle of Ou Mallon and the Dissoí Lógoi thus belong to the positive aspect of Greek skepticism.
Skepticism does not rule out in principle any possibility of deciding between two contradictory propositions
and choosing the one rather than the other. It only rejects realist truth as a basis for a decidable
epistemological procedure. If skepticism were an unrestricted and nihilist criticism against any concept of truth
and decidability, then skeptics would not be able to offer any positive theory. However, Greek skepticism
explicitly adopted anti-realist theses on subjective concepts of belief, evaluation, decidability and preference,
and the possibility of justifying such epistemic acts.145

6.4
The Liar Paradox as a legitimate epistemological case of 'Suspension of Judgment'
(apoché)
The concept of suspension of judgment (apoché) is one of the characteristics of the positive side of Greek
skepticism. It is the rejection of realist truth and the choice of a concept of belief defined according to human
nature and limitations. The idea of 'suspension of judgement' is the basic skeptic strategy of showing that
positive beliefs about truths can be baseless and that there is no ground for claiming that something is known
to be true. It is the epistemological situation of equipollence or the inability to decide between contrary claims.
A skeptical argument against a given dogmatic claim is not intended to establish the truth of the counter-claim.
Rather, the goal is to see why both claims are equally unsupported and why it is more reasonable to remain in
suspension of judgment. Sextus Empiricus, probably the most authoritative source on the subject, defines the
important ideas as follows:
By 'opposed accounts' we do not necessarily have in mind affirmation and negation, but take the phrase simply in the
sense of 'conflicting accounts'. By 'equipollence' we mean equality with regard to being convincing or unconvincing:
none of the conflicting accounts takes precedence over any other as being more convincing. Suspension of
judgement is a standstill of the intellect, owing to which we neither reject nor posit anything.146

The anti-realist tendency of suspension of judgement regarding a claim to truth is the key to dissolving the Liar
Paradox, since what is needed is a legitimate epistemological situation of disconnecting the claim that
someone is telling the truth from the realist consequence that what was said must be the case. Sextus
Empiricus explains what such a situation can be:
We use 'I suspend judgement' for 'I cannot say which of the things proposed I should find convincing and which I
should not find convincing', making clear that the objects appear to us equal in respect of convincingness and lack of
convincingness. Whether they are equal, we do not affirm: we say what appears to us about them, when they make
an impression on us. Suspension of judgement gets its name from the fact that the intellect is suspended so as
neither to posit nor to reject anything because of the equipollence of the matters being investigated.147

Given the above anti-realist tendency, the Liar Paradox can be dissolved. Assume that there are two
contradictory proposition p and not-p. The Liar sentence can be substituted for 'p' like any other legitimate
truth-bearer. The situation raised by the Liar Paradox is that the justification for knowing that p is no more true
than its negation just insofar as the justification for knowing each one is equally good (or equally bad). This is
the sense behind interpreting the Ou Mallon principle, the Dissoí Lógoi and the concept of suspension of
judgment in epistemological terms. Consequently, an analysis of the Liar Paradox within an anti-realist outlook
necessitates the use of epistemic notions. Anti-realism must thus supplement the use of classic logic with
epistemic logic, since truth-value is always an epistemic issue that cannot stand on its own in any objective
sense. It does not necessarily reject classical logic, but sees it as insufficient for a complete analysis, since
epistemic parameters (or operators) are necessary for a full analysis. However, modern anti-realism tends to
replace classical logic with some non-classical system, such as three-valued logic.
For the sake of the argument, assume that the justification n has for knowing that p (i.e., Kn('p')) is just as good
as the justification for knowing that not-p (i.e., Kn('~p'))148. Thus, the premise is:
(1)

The justification n has for knowing that p is equivalent to his justification for
knowing that not-p: ~ Kn('p')º~ Kn('~p')

This will constitute an epistemic reading of Democritus and Nausiphanes. However, it
is still true that:
(2)

It is logically impossible that both 'p' and 'not-p' are true: ~à(pÙ~ p)

The logical corollary of (2) according to epistemic logic is:
(3)

n should know that the conjunction of p and not-p is false: Kn('~ (pÙ~ p)')

The triad of propositions (1)-(3) is perfectly consistent logically as long as epistemic
notions are not mixed with logical ones. Furthermore,
(4)

If n knows that p and also knows some other proposition q, this provides a
justification for knowing that p and q: [Kn('p')Ù Kn('q')]É Kn('pÙ q')

Thus, no one can know a false proposition.
(5)

If it is impossible that p, then n does not know that p: ~àpÉ~Kn('p')

If a given proposition is false, then there cannot be sufficient reason for knowing it. It
can be false knowledge or a mistake, but not genuine knowledge. In any case, there
cannot be any sufficient reason to know obvious impossibilities. To summarize (1)(5), the conclusion regarding the contradiction generated by the Liar Paradox is that:

(6)

If it is logically impossible that both 'p' and 'not-p' are true, then n cannot have
any justification for knowing this impossibility: ~à(pÙ~ p)É~Kn('(pÙ~ p)')

So far, there is no disagreement with realism, but at the same time, the Liar Paradox
is still unresolved.
Even Protagoras could surely have accepted the above reasoning, especially (2) and
(6), due to his reputation as a shrewd philosopher. Due to his epistemological
relativism, however, he would derive a different conclusion from it. Protagoras can be
fairly characterized as holding a version of extreme empiricism, according to which it
is impossible to found genuinely objective judgments on subjective foundations.
Accordingly, his relativist epistemology implies the following claim:
(7)

Although nobody can know overt impossibilities, it is possible that some
proposition p may be known by one person n to be true while its negation is
known by other person m to be true: ~à(pÙ~p)Ù[Kn('p')ÙKm('~ p ')]

This situation is legitimate in epistemic notions as long as objective knowledge is
rejected as unattainable. According to Protagoras, man is the measure of truth and
there are no objective grounds for determining the realist truth-value of a given belief:
Thus according to him man becomes the criterion of the things that are; for everything
that seems to men, actually is; and what seems to no man, is not. [80A14]

There is no objective truth but only an empiricist version of subjective relativism:
Sometimes when the same wind blows, one of us shivers and the other doesn't; or one
of us mildly, the other violently. - Yes indeed - Then shall we say that the wind is in
itself cold or not cold? [80B1, Plato, Theaetetus 152B]

In epistemic logic, this will amount to the rejection of the possibility that any
proposition can be known to be true by everyone just because it is objectively true.
That is, there cannot be a universal quantification over the knowing subjects.
(8)

It is never the case that everyone know some proposition to be true:
~"x$yKx('y')

Thus, according to subjective relativism, it is perfectly possible that two persons know
two contradictory propositions to be true at the same time.
(9)

n knows p to be true while m knows it to be false: Kn('p')ÙKm('~ p ')

Line (9) can be taken further and quantified as follows:
(10)

There is a ‘x’ and a ‘y’ such that x knows ‘p’ to be true while y knows it to be
false: $x$y(Kx('p')ÙKy('~ p '))

An even further exclusion of subjective relativism would be to accept the possibility
that the same person can know a proposition to be true at one time and to be false at
another. Protagoras is known for his extreme empiricism regarding sense
perceptions:
Everything that seems to men, actually is; and what seems to no man, is not. [80A14]

To this empiricist relativism he added a relativist theory of knowledge:
Protagoras says that on every issue it is possible for it to be argued with equal force on
both sides. [80A20]

There is a scholarly controversy about radical his epistemology is in its
subjectivity149. However, if one understands his position as an extremely radical
one, then a way of dissolving the Liar Paradox in line with the philosophy of
Protagoras is clear:
(11)

‘x’ in line (10) above is not necessarily identical to ‘y’: ~ ð(x¹y)ºà(x=y).

Conclusion: If the Liar Paradox is rephrased in epistemic terms, its conclusion is not
a strict logical impossibility. It can be a legitimate possible epistemic situation, in
which a person knows two contradictory propositions to be true at two different times.
Namely:
(12)

n knows p to be true at one time and knows it to be false at another time:
Kn('p')ÙKn('~ p')

However, to maintain line (11), line (4) must be rejected on epistemic considerations.
This rejection will follow, in a general way, the rationale behind three-valued logic or
intuitionistic logic, which is to be expected in view of their anti-realist and skeptic
stance.
Full-blown epistemological relativism, especially if it is as radical as the one
Protagoras holds, does have its shortcomings. More moderate versions distinguish
between two basic cases. In the first case, the truth-value of propositions can be
determined, because intrinsic properties of object are involved (this kind of
propositions involves an eteêi quality). In the second case, this cannot be done
because non-intrinsic properties are involved (this kind of proposition involves nomôi
qualities)150. Thus, skepticism applies only to certain cases and does not
necessarily discard knowledge as a whole. This can be rephrased as follows
(starting again with premise (6) above):
(7)

Either the conjunction of p and not-p is false (if p involves a nomôi quality), or
else one cannot know which, if either, of p or not-p is true (if p involves an
eteêi quality): ~à(pÙ~ p)Ú(~ Kn('p)Ú~ Kn('~ p'))

Now, the Ou Mallon principle is relevant to cases of undetermined rational beliefs, in
which we have two propositions such that neither of them is reasonable to accept,
nor can we accept one and reject the other. Assuming premise (1), above, then:
(8)

Possibly both p and not-p: àpÙà ~p

Anti-realism recognizes cases in which it cannot be determined whether one is telling
the truth. In other words, if one asserts that he is telling the truth, it does not
necessarily follow that the asserted proposition is indeed true. Thus, the following
epistemological situation is a legitimate one in anti-realist or skeptic terms:
(9)

Even though n says that 'p' and says
that it is true, it does not necessarily
follows that indeed p151.

n says that 'p'
n tells the truth

follows that indeed p151.

n tells the truth
--------------------~ ðp

This situation is one of the points where realism and anti-realism diverge. The
objective ground in realism disappears and the need to suspend judgement
becomes a necessity. As Sextus Empiricus remarks:
The phrase… 'I do not apprehend' also shows the skeptic's own feeling, in virtue of which he
refrains, for the moment, from positing or rejecting any of the unclear matters being
investigated152.

Therefore:
(10)

If n says he knows that p, it is still possible that not-p: Kn('p')Éà~p

Conclusion: If this situation is legitimate, as it is in relativist epistemology, then the
idea that there is a necessary logical relation between asserting a proposition and its
truthfulness is rejected. The Liar Paradox can be generated only if there is an
objective, necessary connection between saying that one knows ‘p’ and its
truthfulness. However, from an anti-realist and skeptic stance, this connection is
rejected and the paradox is thereby dissolved.

7.

Conclusion: The Liar Paradox as a metaphysical issue

The use of the Liar Paradox by skeptics as a form of critical thinking has an important role in intellectual
progress, as Popper notes in his paper, "What is dialectics?"
[Dialectics observes], correctly, that contradictions are of the greatest importance in the history of thought - precisely
as important as is criticism. For criticism invariably consists in pointing out some contradiction... a contradiction
within the theory criticized... Criticism can never do anything except either point out some such contradiction, or,
perhaps, simply contradict the theory... But criticism is, in a very important sense, the main motive force of any
intellectual development. Without contradictions, without criticism, there would be no rational motive for changing our
theories: there would be no intellectual progress.153

The 'critical method' is the special mark of Greek skepticism, as it is most concerned to refute theories as a
means to acquire tranquillity. Skeptic philosophers use the Liar Paradox to elicit particular implications of the
general theory of realism with the intention of showing its internal inconsistency. The use of the Liar Paradox is
only one instance of the rational procedure embodied in the use of the Reduction ad Absurdum. Criticism and
refutation form the very structure of Greek skepticism and the 'critical method' is the key to understanding the
tensions between skepticism and dogmatism. Greek skepticism did not just reject a given philosophical view,
as the mere act of contradicting a philosophical claim, but critically examined it and devised destructive
arguments. The nature of the criticism is the crucial distinction between rejecting an argument for a conclusion
and rejecting the conclusion itself, for which the Double Arguments is maybe the earliest example. The Liar
Paradox plays a part in rejecting the realist position by critically examining its arguments. Placing the Liar
Paradox in this broad context assigns it a more fundamental function in philosophy than a mere semantical
difficulty or sophism. Thus, its nature and function must be derived from the place it has in the general critical
discussion of the question of realism. The paradox thus becomes a part of a Reduction ad Absurdum
argument in metaphysics and epistemology.
One of the prevailing ways of dismissing the Liar Paradox (as noted in section 5.3, above) is by calling it
counter-intuitive - an argument that opposes the common intuitions regarding the use of the words ‘true’ and
‘false’. However, this reaction misses the whole point, since the threat of the paradox is not for common sense

‘false’. However, this reaction misses the whole point, since the threat of the paradox is not for common sense
but for metaphysics, just as Zeno's paradoxes of motion do not throated the common sense of everyday life,
but the metaphysics of ontological pluralism. The fact that common sense and perception contradict Eleatic
metaphysics is no justification for rejecting it, since common sense is not a metaphysical theory, as realism or
ontological pluralism are. It is told about Antisthenes that:
Antisthenes the Cynic, unable to answer [Zeno's arguments against motion] got up and walked, deeming a proof by
action more potent than any logical confutation. [29A15]154

Obviously Antisthenes missed the whole point. The aim of the Eleatic school was to construct an argument in a
metaphysical controversy about the true ontology of reality. Common sense was rejected as a metaphysical
theory about reality and not as an instrument of practical life and action. Both Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes
Laertius say that Parmenides
…makes it clear that one should not attend to the senses but to reason. [28A1. Diogenes Laertius IX.22]

Parmenides puts it this way:
You must debar your thought from this way of search [for the truth], nor let ordinary experience in its variety force you
along this way, [namely, that of allowing] the eye, sightless as it is, and the ear, full of sound, and the tongue
[namely, language], to rule; but [you must] judge by means of the reason [argument, logôi] the much-contested
refutation which is expounded by me. [28B7.3-6]

Parmenides warns against relying on the senses, which lead people along the path of deceptive opinions
paved with falsity. Only reason and arguments can lead people along the narrow path of Truth (28B8)155.
Parmenides put the whole weight of proof and disproof on reason, since he sees his metaphysical claims as
based on logical and rational inquiry. Parmenides' conclusions should not be rejected on the basis of sense
perception. Rather, his reasoning must be countered by reasoning, namely, showing were his arguments fail.
In contrast to Antisthenes' failure to understand Parmenides' logical point, the following example shows an
attempt to face Parmenides' reasoning on the logical level.
Melissus of Samos is known for his poem On Being, in defense of Parmenides' theory (30A4). He introduces
a Reduction ad Absurdum argument to support ontological monism and Eleatic metaphysics (30B8).
Aristocles of Messene quotes this argument and then criticizes it (30A14). He raises an objection to skeptical
arguments about the senses, which constitutes an important part of Melissus' reductio, as it was an important
part of Parmenides' metaphysics. Aristocles' main criticism is that Melissus starts from the data of
perceptions and ends by disregarding them, and thus, his argument is self-refuting. Aristocles has mistakenly
assumed that Melissus believes in relying on the senses, whereas Melissus only presents this as a hypothesis
which he eventually shows to be false156. However, the important point here is that Aristocles was trying to
refute Melissus' argument on logical grounds, thus meeting Parmenides' requirement.. Furthermore, he clearly
saw the true nature of the Eleatic arguments as metaphysical ones that have nothing to do with sense
perceptions of everyday life. They constitute a logical and rational investigation, and so any criticism of them
must be logical and rational as well.
The Liar Paradox is completely analogous in this respect to the metaphysical arguments of the Eleatics. The
reasons that it was formulated and used in the skeptics' arguments are metaphysical and epistemological.
There is nothing in the paradox that involves the normal use of natural language; its only concern is with the
theoretical claims of the metaphysical doctrine of realism.
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further formulation of the principle see On Interpretation 18a28-31; Prior Analytics 51b36-40.
54Metaphysics 1011b23-24.
55Metaphysics 1012a10-15. This formulation can be seen as alternative version of the principle of bivalence.
56On Interpretation 17a3-4. The last formulation of the principle of bivalence explicitly refers to the principle of the excluded middle. These two principles are entangled with each other, though the one does not necessarily imply the other, as shown by modern Intuitionistic logic.
57Metaphysics 1011b25-26.
58The skeptics of the classical and Hellenistic periods already saw the Presocratic philosophers as the forerunners of late Greek skepticism. For a detailed survey of early skepticism in Presocratic philosophy, see Groarke 1990, chapter 2.
59Diogenes Laertius IX.72. This assertion is part of a major argument raised by Democritus concerning the limitations of the senses in knowing reality. It is part of his atomistic physics, as this skepticism was aimed at the empiricist criterion of knowing the truth. Democritus still held that the
"true" (in its realist meaning) construction of reality can be known through a sort of rationalistic method; it only cannot be known by the empiricist criterion.
60Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians I.49 (110).
61Plutarch, Table-Talk IX.7 (746B). See also Barnes’ analysis of these two fragments (Barnes 1982: 136-143).
62This kind of problems are extensively discussed in the secondary literature. As for the above, see, for instance, On Interpretation sec. IX, 18a28ff. Cf. Lukasiewicz's discussion of the difference between the principles of the excluded middle and bivalence in Aristotle, and the problems they
involve (Lukasiewicz 1971, 1972: 82). See also On Interpretation 17a33-38, 19a27-36 and On Interpretation 19a39-19b4. For additional examples see, e.g., On Interpretation 17b30. This discussion is naturally connected to the issue of fatalism, which was known in the ancient world as the Idler
argument (argos logós). For Cicero’s discussion of this argument and Chrysippus' criticism, see Cicero, On Fate 28-30. For his confidence in the certainty of logical principles, see Metaphysics 1005b11-1011b22. Cf. Lear 1980, chapter 6.
63For the argument see Plato, Euthydemus 283E-284C. Afterwards, Euthydemus’ brother, Dionisodorus, begins with Euthydemus’ conclusion, that a false proposition is impossible, and argues that it is impossible to contradict a given proposition. For a discussion of this passage in particular and
the general question regarding the possibility of false propositions, see Denyer 1991, 15-18. Sprague argues that Euthydemus is an historical figure of the time of Socrates (Sprague 1972: 294-295). Hermann Diels, however, did not think so, and thus did not include him in his Die Fragmente der
Vorsokratiker. For the important citations from the Euthydemus which can be ascribed to the historical Euthydemus, see Sprague 1972: 295-301.
64The attribution of the paradoxical proposition to Prodicus and the hints of the argument in support of this proposition are given in a papyrus revealed in Cairo in 1941. For the relevant passage and a discussion of this papyrus see Denyer 1991, 26-27, Kerferd 1981, 89-90. The fragment is not
included in Diels-Kranz. For the other fragments of Prodicus and a biographic survey, see Sprague 1972, 70-85.
65Aristotle, Topica 104b20-21. See also Diogenes Laertius, VI.1-19. For a discussion of Antisthenes' philosophy, see Denyer 1991, 27-33, 36-37, Dudley 1967, 1-16. The prevailing conjecture is that Antisthenes is the one of the main targets of the dialogues that discuss Plato’s position on issues
such as proper names, propositions, truth, falsehood and contradiction. This conjecture, if true, shows the philosophical importance of his assertions on these philosophical issues. However, see the reservation raised by Taylor 1960, 86, note 1.
66The above descriptions of the theory of truth held by Antisthenes, and the way he derives his conclusion, are based on Aristotle’s discussion of the subject in the Metaphysics 1024b29-1025a1.
67Diogenes Laertius VI.3
68For this issue, see Denyer’s introduction to Aristotle’s approach (Denyer 1991: chapter 10).
69This is a ‘reasonable’ assumption in the sense that there is no contradictory evidence, while there is some circumstantial evidence for its correctness. It is known, for instance, that there was a heated controversy on logical and philosophical issues in general between Euclides of Megara and
Eubulides of Miletos on the one hand and Aristotle on the other. The fact that Aristotle refers to the Liar Paradox as part of his general discussion in sophistical arguments is important. This places the Liar Paradox within the typical philosophizing of the Megarians and of Eubulides in particular.
70This version is based on Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations 180b2-4. For a more elaborate version see below. The alterations in the above version are based on the Aristotelian commentator Alexander of Aphrodisias, Commentarium in Aristotelis Sophisticos Elenchos, f65b (171.18f).
71This is not a trivial conclusion, since it is rejected by paraconsistent logic, which considers a contradiction a legitimate proposition and argues that logic should acknowledge the existence of paradoxes and assimilate them as a legitimate part of logical reasoning. For a survey of the subject and a
comprehensive collection of papers on it , see Priest, Routley and Norman 1989. Graham Priest is a known advocate of paraconsistent logic. See, e.g., Priest 1979, 1984.
72There are at least seven paradoxes attributed to Eubulides, including the Liar Paradox. See Diogenes Laertius, II.108. On the Liar Paradox see Cicero, De Divinatione II.11, Academica II.96. Cf. Bochenski 1961, 105ff, 131; Kneale 1962, 113-114; Rist 1969, 146; Watson 1966, p. 67.
73Not much is known about the Megarian School and its prominent figures. Most of the evidence is taken from Diogenes Laertius, which sums up most of what is known today about the school. See Diogenes Laertius, II.106-109, 111-114, VII.1-2, 16, 25, 168, 179-180. There is some additional
important evidence in the writings of Sextus Empiricus, which will be cited below.
74The model for dialectical investigation available to Plato and Aristotle was Zeno of Elea and his use of Reductio arguments. Zeno was considered by Aristotle and others as the inventor of dialectics (Diogenes Laertius, VII.57, IX.25; Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians I.7). For a
discussion of dialectics in Plato's dialogues and the Socratic questioning (élenchos), see Robinson 1962, chapter 10.
75For instance, Diodorus Cronus, one of the prominent members of the school, was known by the epithet "the dialectician". See Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors I.310.
76For the claim that Reductio arguments are the most basic meaning of 'dialectics', see Plato, Phaedo 101D.
77Diogenes Laertius, II.106-108.
78Diogenes Laertius, II.109, IV.36.
79For the connections between the Megarian and the Eleatic schools, see Diogenes Laertius, II.106-107; Cicero, Academica II.129. For a discussion of this philosophical influence, and for more evidence, see Groarke 1990, 70-71.
80Kneale notes dialectics was used in metaphysical arguments in fourth-century Greek philosophy (Kneale 1962, 7).
81Prior Analytics 24a23-26. For one of the discussions given by Aristotle on the issue of dialectics, which is relevant to the above discussion, see Topica 104a2-105a34. For an analysis of the issue from a logical point of view, see also Lear 1980, chapter 3.
82The early dialogues are the most important in the above respect, since they end in inconclusiveness (aphoría). The dramatic effect and the philosophical point are due, on the one hand, to Socrates' success in refuting his opponents’ assertions, and, on the other, to the lack of a positive
answer to the problem discussed in the dialogue. This point is elaborated by Alexander Koyre (1960: book I).
83Prior Analytics 41a.23-34. Aristotle mentions this in several other places. See, e.g., Prior Analytics 40b25, 45b15, 50a32.
84Prior Analytics 50a35-6.
85This special form of arguments is probably the reason for the great interest of the Megarian school and consequently of Stoicism in the issues of hypothetical propositions and the correct semantic definition of implication. For more on this see Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism II.110112.
86Aristotle, Prior Analytics 41a31-3.
87There is occasional confusion about the difference between Reduction ad Absurdum and Reduction ad Impossibile. Reductio ad Impossibile involves the entailment of a contradiction, while the Reduction ad Absurdum involves the entailment of merely an obvious falsehood, but not a

involve the entailment of falsehood in most cases. Indirect mathematical
proofs are examples of Impossibile. The first source for the use of Reductio ad Impossibile is probably the
Pythagorean mathematicians. The Pythagorean philosophers used this form in discovering the geometrical
expression of the irrational number . Aristotle classifies the proof of this theorem as a typical example of a
Reductio ad Impossibile that is based on the logical and philosophical entailment of a self-contradictory
contradiction. The early Socratic dialogues are an example of the type of Absurdum, since they

conclusion. For the details of this example, see Prior Analytics 41a21-41b4. Plato, however, was apparently
unaware of the difference between these two sorts of Reductio. In the Phaedo, where he discusses
hypothetical argumentation, he says that every refutation of a hypothesis is based on the derivation of
contradictory conclusions (Phaedo 101D). On the other hand, not every argument in the dialogue is of the
Reductio ad Impossibile form. One possibility is to see Reduction ad Absurdum as the more general form,
and Reductio ad Impossibile as an instance of it.
88Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations 174b13-20. For the citation see there 174b16. For the nature of
paradoxes, see also the Art of Rhetoric 1399a22-25.
89There have been many studies of the logic used by the Megarian School and their followers in the Stoic

89There have been many studies of the logic used by the Megarian School and their followers in the Stoic
school. For the more basic ones, see Bochenski 1961, 109-130, Graeser 1978, Kneale 1962, 113-176,
Mates 1953, Mueller 1978. See there for the substantial differences between Aristotelian logic and the
Megarian and Stoic schools. See especially the discussion about the subtle difference between a sound
argument and an argument that is merely valid. Part of the interpretation proposed here is based on the
various details of this logic.
90This conjecture is shared by three of the authorities on the history of the logic of the Megarian and the Stoic
schools. See Bochenski 1961, 105-109, Kneale 1962, 113-117 and Mates 1953, 5-8.
91Prior Analytics 53b12-57B18. This passage is enigmatic since it does not fit into the sequence of subjects
in the text, nor is its relation to Aristotelian logic clear. Cf. Kneale 1962, 97.
92See the passage Prior Analytics 57a36-57b17. The above schema is based on the example discussed by
Aristotle in that passage. Cf. Kneale 1962, 96ff.
93For the formulation of the rule of contraposition, see Prior Analytics 53b12.
94For the formulation of the rule of transitivity, see Prior Analytics 57b6.
96It is known that Eubulides criticized much of Aristotle’s philosophy and raised many detailed objections to it.
However, not much is known about the details of the controversy. The main testimony to this is Diogenes
Laertius, II.109.
97This is important for understanding the position of logic in Greek philosophy. For Plato, for instance, logical
and mathematical investigations were used for the sake of discovering moral and metaphysical truths. This
fact is manifest in many places. For instance, in Euthydemus 290A-E and Republic bk. VII, Plato talks about
the education of the ideal ruler. Logic was not an independent subject even for Aristotle and the Peripatetic
school. It was always understood as an ability or capacity (dúnamis) that can be taught just like any other skill
or craft (techné) and thus should be part of general philosophical inquiry and teaching.
98Cf. Aristotle, Topica 159a18-25. Aristotle points out there that generating a paradox is the final goal of
dialectical inquiry. See also On Sophistical Refutations 172b9-173a30, where Aristotle discusses at some
length how to generate a paradox in a dialectical inquiry and notes that this is the goal of the sophist is
philosophizing.
99Mates names this logic and the "Megarian-Stoic logic". For the logical terms used above see Mates 1953,
chapter 5.
100Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism II.136. See also Against the Logicians II.367.
101Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians II.115ff. See also Outlines of Pyrrhonism II.110ff.
102Sextus Empiricus Outlines of Pyrrhonism II.137; Against the Logicians II.415.
103The definition of validity is attributed to Diodorus Cronus (Diogenes Laertius, VII.77).
104Diogenes Laertius, VII.79; Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism II.138.
105Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism II.157ff, Against the Logicians II.223, 228; Diogenes Laertius,
VII.79ff.
106Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism II.156ff.
107Cicero, Topica 57.
108Sextus Empiricus Outlines of Pyrrhonism II.157; Against the Logicians II.225 and 227; Diogenes
Laertius, VII.80. It is reasonable to assume that the source of this schema was the Megarian School, since it is
fundamental to the dialectics of refutation used by Zeno of Elea.
109Sextus Empiricus Outlines of Pyrrhonism II.158; Against the Logicians II.226; Diogenes Laertius, VII.80.
110Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians II.229, 230, 231, 235, 237, 240; Diogenes Laertius, VII.77.
111Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians II.292; Outlines of Pyrrhonism II.242, 243. The above schema is
a slight alteration of Sextus' exposition. Cf. Against the Logicians II.281. See also Against the Logicians
II.466 and Outlines of Pyrrhonism II.186. The reasonable assumption is that this inference-schema or theorem

II.466 and Outlines of Pyrrhonism II.186. The reasonable assumption is that this inference-schema or theorem
is part of the Eleatic dialectical heritage that was transferred to the to Stoics by their Megarian teachers. Cf.
Mates 1953, 80ff.
112Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians II.231.
113Sextus Empiricus shows in detail how this is done. He also gives examples of how to analyze an argument
into its basic components.
114Diogenes Laertius, VII.79. Sextus Empiricus Outlines of Pyrrhonism II.187.
115Diogenes Laertius, VII.45.
116Menedemus is considered one of the members of the Megarian School. See Cicero, Academica II.129;
Diogenes Laertius II.125-144. See also Denyer 1991, 37-43. The important point for the above discussion is
that the Eretrian school, which was founded by Menedemus after he left the Megarian School, was based on
the dialectics of the Megarians.
117Plutarch, On Compliancy 536B.
118Diogenes Laertius II.135.
119It is not difficult to see the resemblance between the theory discussed by Menedemus and Frege's
approach. It is most striking with regard to the primacy of the relation between names and facts, which is
similar to the function of proper names. See, e.g., Frege, 1892, 63. There are some similar modern examples
of a theory of truth based on a rigid proposition-fact relation, akin to the name-object relation. See, e.g., the
approach of Frank Ramsey (1965: 73-74 and 139-140).
120There is a disagreement among scholars, as to whether Menedemus held this theory of truth or whether it
was only a part of his philosophical criticism of such theories, which were discussed at the time by the
Megarian School. From the testimonies of Diogenes Laertius and others, it appears prima facie that this
theory was held by Menedemus himself. Diogenes Laertius and the others are, however, ambiguous on this
question. Denyer believes that this was a philosophical theory held by Menedemus (Denyer 1991: 37-43).
Denyer does not, however, give any reasons for this and does not comment on the question of how this can
conform with other contrary evidence about Menedemus. I suggest that the correct understanding of the above
theory is that it is part of Menedemus’ discussion of the paradox and provides the background for its
formulation. The theory underlies the Reductio ad Absurdum aiming at disproving or refuting this theory of
meaning. This interpretation conforms to several items of evidence about Menedemus as a philosopher, and I
will mention only a few of them. First, Menedemus was known to have propound riddles and raised
philosophical difficulties. Second, it is known that he taught philosophy, and that he was influenced by the
dialectics of the Megarian School. Therefore, it is more reasonable that the theory of truth he presented was
part of his teaching dialectics rather than a dogmatic teaching. Third, some of his philosophical riddles, cited
by Diogenes Laertius, mock this particular theory, and it is thus unreasonable to assume that it was a theory
he believed in. Finally, Diogenes Laertius cites Antigonos of Karistos, who says that Menedemus never held
any philosophical theory. These considerations and others indicate that Menedemus introduced the theory for
the purpose of refuting it eventually with, inter alia, the aid of his paradox. The paradox is therefore part of the
criticism which characterized Menedemus' style of philosophizing rather than part of a serious dogmatic
teaching.
121It is known that Megarian School had an important role in forming Greek skepticism as it was a major
influence for the adoption of the dialectical method and the centrality of refutation in late Greek skepticism. It is
prominent regarding the education of the skeptical philosophers. Most of the Pyrrhonist and Academic
philosophers were taught by prominent figures in the Megarian School or their pupils. There are testimonies
regarding these connections. They also attest to the general influence of the Megarian School on Greek
skepticism, as well as the place of dialectics in Greek skepticism. See Diogenes Laertius IV.32, IX.61, and
64; Cicero, Academica II.97; Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.234, II.94; Suidas, "Pyrrho," II.278,
"Socrates," IV.404. See also Groarke 1990, especially 70-71, 86-89 and 101. Groarke discusses the various
problems about the exact historical connections between the Megarian philosophers and the many founders of
Greek skepticism. From these testimonies and many others it is clear that there was a strong connection
between the Megarian school and late Greek skepticism.

between the Megarian school and late Greek skepticism.
122Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations 180a23-180b.
123On Sophistical Refutations 166b21-27. Aristotle enumerates seven types of violation of inference rules
that lead to fallacies. The Liar Paradox is classified within the second fallacy. For a summary of the discussion
of fallacies that occur in practical arguments and a list of the various sorts of violation of inference rules in
these fallacies, see Bochenski 1961, 54-55.
124For examples of this kind of fallacy, see On Sophistical Refutations 166b38-167a20.
125On Sophistical Refutations 180a32-180b2.
126On Sophistical Refutations 180b2-7.
127The ‘idler argument’ (argós lógos) is discussed in length by Aristotle in the ninth chapter of On
Interpretation. It begins with the assumption that every affirmation or negation of a proposition is either true or
false (18a28ff). The argument continues with a realist specification of the concept of truth, which is based on a
strict relation of correspondence (18b37 and 19a33). These two premises lead to the problem of fatalism and
free will. Aristotle proposes a modal theory as a solution. The Megarian School raised several serious
criticisms against this modal theory, some of which are noted by Aristotle, Metaphysics 1046b29ff. Afterward,
one of the remarkable dialecticians of the Megarian School improved the criticism in light of Aristotle’s replies.
See Plutarch, On Stoic Self Contradictions 1055D; Cicero, On Fate 13, 17 and 28-30. For a presentation of
the fundamental philosophical problem raised by the idler argument, see Taylor 1957. For a discussion on the
Aristotelian example of the naval battle, see Taylor 1957, 1, note 2. For a discussion on the Idler argument in
Greek philosophy, see Mates 1953, 38-41; Rist 1969, chapter 7. An interesting point in Diodorus Cronus'
criticism is the argument known 'the master', since it was supposed to be irrefutable. See Epictetus,
Discourses II19.1-5. The argument assumes three basic premises, which are implied by the Aristotelian
realism and deal with the concepts of truth and necessity. However, it turns out that these premises are
incompatible (máchomai). They thus constitute a Reductio ad Absurdum argument against the Aristotelian
approach. The argument was constructed as such according to the Megarian tradition, as discussed above.
For the logical and modal analysis of the master argument see Mates 1953, 38-40.
128This fragment describes the way Chrysippus understood the Liar Paradox and his thoughts about how to
solve it. See Von Arnim 1964, II.298 a (106f). Not much is known about this fragment beyond its content. For
its translation and a discussion on the content of this interesting fragment, see Bochenski 1961, 133.
129There are many studies on Stoic epistemology, its theory of truth and its propositional logic. See, for
instance, Graeser 1978, 128-158, Mates 1953, chapter II, Mueller 1978, Watson 1966. For a detailed
discussion of the nature of the criterion of truth in Stoic epistemology, see Rist 1969, chapter 8. For the
similarity between the semantics developed by Stoicism and the theories of Frege and Carnap, see Mates
1953, 19-26. See p. 16 for a graphic scheme that emphasizes Stoicism's underlying realist outlook.
130Cf. Diogenes Laertius VII.63; Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians II.11, 38.
131Kripke 1975, Van Fraassen 1968, 1969.
132Cicero, Academica II.95.
133For a discussion on the irrelevancy of such a reaction to the problems raised by philosophical skepticism,
see Stroud 1979, 279ff.
135Academica II.147.
136Sextus Empiricus stresses this point in several places. See for instance the Outlines of Pyrrhonism II.244246.
137The new versions of the ordinary Liar Paradox are commonly classified as "strengthened liar". These
strengthened versions were formulated as a response to the attempts made to solve the more ordinary
versions. Robert Martin gives a short exposition to this evolution of the Liar Paradox in the "Introduction" to his
anthology (Martin 1984). For further discussion on this complex evolution see also Barwise and Etchemendy
1987.

1987.
138Greek skepticism distinguished between arguments that are external to realism, which are the constructive
ones, and internal arguments, which are of the Reductio ad Absurdum form. On the one hand, there are
Eanesidemus’ Ten Modes against absolute proposition. These modes are an epistemological criticism
constructed from a point of view external to realism and are empirical in their nature. On the other hand, there
are Agrippa’s Five Modes, which are considered complementary to those of Eanesidemus. These modes
focus on conceptual and abstract issues from point of view internal to realism. They are a priori and logical,
and some of them are formulated as refutation arguments, having the Reductio ad Absurdum form.
Concerning Eanesidemus, see Diogenes Laertius, IX.78ff; Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians II.345.ff;
Outlines of Pyrrhonism I36.ff. Concerning Agrippa, see Diogenes Laertius, IX.88-89; Sextus Empiricus,
Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.167-177.
139One of the points made by Plato in the Parmenides is to show that Zeno's dialectics is at least as
damaging to the Eleatic doctrine as to the doctrine of ontological pluralism and movement. For an examination
of the Parmenides see Solmsen 1971, Vlastos 1975, Von Fritz 1974.
140The Ou Mallon principle is known also as the principle of Isonomia. For the formulation of the principle of
Ou Mallon by Democritus, see fragment 68A114. There are additional testimonies regarding the nature of the
skeptic formula of ‘one proposition is no more true than another’ and the philosophical discussion is
generated. See also Cicero, Academica 2.43; Eusebius, Preparatio evangelica 738a; Hippolytus, Refutatio
Omnium Haeresium I.23-3; Plutarch, Reply to Colotes 1108F, 1109A; Sextus Empiricus, Against the
Logicians I.389. On the adoption of the Ou Mallon principle by various trends in Greek skepticism see also
Eusebius, Preparatio evangelica 726d; Plutarch, Reply to Colotes 1124A; Sextus Empiricus, Against the
Logicians I.232. For a discussion of the principle, see Barnes 1982, 553ff, DeLacy 1958, 1971, Groarke
1990, 52ff and 59ff.
141Aristotle, Metaphysics 1009b9-12.
142This text was found attached to works by Sextus Empiricus there is an opinion that it was written by one of
Protagoras’ pupils. For a translation of the text, see Freeman 1966, 417-423. For another translation, see
Sprague 1972, 279-293. For a discussion of the importance of this text for understanding the sophist
movement, see Groarke 1990, 49ff, Kerferd 1981, 54, 84-85, Levi 1940, Taylor 1987. For a discussion of the
moral relativism presented in this text, see Barnes 1982, 516-522.
143Diogenes Laertius, IX.51. Protagoras made this the issue of a treatise in two books, 80B5 and 80A1.
According to Diogenes Laertius, the Art of Eristics is dedicated to "disputations on famous subjects" (80A6).
On the second text, see Diogenes Laertius IX.55.
144For these two assumptions regarding the concept of truth, see Dissoi Logoi IV.2 and 6-9, respectively.
The text does not spell out the two assumptions explicitly, but it is a natural and direct reading in modern terms.
Furthermore, without these assumptions there is no consistent way to understand the argument for the
antithesis in the passage IV.6-9.
145The distinction between the negative and the positive aspects of Greek skepticism is important for
understanding it as a philosophical school. This is one of the more important points in Groarke’s work. One of
his goals was to show why it is foolish to reject ancient skepticism as meaningless or contradictory. See,
chapter I.
146Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.10.
147Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.196.
148My use of epistemic logic generally follows the work of Jaakko Hintikka (1962), which is still considered
the most interesting and basic work. The basic notions of epistemic logic that are relevant for the following are:
149See the discussion in Barnes 1982, 541ff.
150One example of this kind of epistemological relativism is Democritus' philosophy. See, e.g., Barnes 1982,
559ff.

151Megarian-Stoic logic distinguished between the negation of a proposition and the statement that the
proposition is false. Here are several examples of the way this was done:
1.
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See Diogenes Laertius, VII.78-79.
152Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism I.201.
153Popper 1965, 316.
154Cf . Barnes 1982, 296.
155Cf. Barnes 1982, 156.
156For an analysis of Melissus' argument and for more detail on Aristocles' failure to criticize Melissus' argument see, Barnes 1982, 298ff.

157There are a number of editions and naming systems of the writings of Sextus Empiricus. As mentioned, I
follow the Loeb edition. For a discussion of this issue see the Introduction to the first volume dedicated to the
writings of Sextus Empiricus.
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134See note 64.
95The concise conclusion is ‘aÉ~a-->~a ’, which was already known in the Middle Ages by the name
Consequentia Mirabilis (Lukasiewicz 1972: 50-51, 80).

